


June 2011

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Mediation for peace

Conflict Management in Indonesia – An Analysis of the Conflicts in Maluku, Papua and Poso

The Indonesian Institute of Sciences,
Current Asia and the Centre for
Humanitarian Dialogue



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“Mediation for peace”

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Acronyms and terminology

Adat

Group of customary laws or the unwritten traditional code that regulates social political, and economic practices, as well as dispute resolution

AJI

The Indonesian Journalists Alliance / Aliansi Jurnalis Independen

BAKORNAS PBP

The National Coordinating Body for Disaster and Internally Displaced Persons Management / Badan Koordinasi Nasional Penanganan Bencana dan Pengungsi

Bappenas

National Development Planning Agency / Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional

BIN

State Intelligence Agency / Badan Intelijen Negara

Brimob

Mobile Brigade / Brigade Mobil

Bupati

Indonesia is divided into provinces. Provinces are made up of regencies and cities. Provinces, regencies and cities do have their own local governments and parliamentary bodies. Regencies are headed by a bupati, normally translated into English as regent

DOM

Military operation zone / Daerah Operasi Militer

DPD

Regional Representatives Council / Dewan Perwakilan Daerah

DPR

People's Representative Council / Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat

ELSHAM

Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy / Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Hak Asasi Manusia

GoI

Government of Indonesia

IDP

Internally displaced people or person

Kodam

Military Regional Command / Komando Daerah Militer

Kodap

Territorial War Command / Komando Daerah Perang

KOMNAS HAM

Indonesia's National Commission for Human Rights / Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia

KontraS

Commission on Missing Persons and Victims of Violence / Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan

KOPASSUS

Special Forces Command / Komando Pasukan Khusus

Korem

Sub-regional military command / Komando Resort Militer

LBH Jakarta

Jakarta Legal Aid Institute / Lembaga Bantuan Hukum

LIPI

Indonesian Institute of Sciences /
Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia

Menko Kesra

Coordinating Ministry for People's Welfare /
Kementrian Koordinator Kesejahteraan Rakyat

Pemekaran

Division of provinces and districts into smaller
administrative units

Perda

Regional regulations / Peraturan Daerah

POLRI

Indonesian National Police /
Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia

TNI

Indonesian National Army /
Tentara Nasional Indonesia

UKP4

Presidential Working Unit for Supervision
and Management of Development /
Unit Kerja Presiden bidang Pengawasan dan
Pengendalian Pembangunan

YLBHI

Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation /
Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia

Maluku specific**FKM**

Maluku Front Sovereignty /
Front Kedaulatan Maluku

GPM

Maluku Protestant Churches /
Geredja Protestant Maluku

ICMI

Association of Muslim Intellectuals /
Ikatan cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia

Malino II

Malino Peace Agreement /
Perjanjian Malino II

MMC

Maluku Media Centre

PARKINDO

The Indonesian Christian Party /
Partai Kristen Indonesia

PDI

The Indonesian Democratic Party /
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia

PDI-P

The Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle /
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan

RMS

Republic of South Maluku /
Republik Maluku Selatan

Papua specific**DAP**

Papua Customary Council / Dewan Adat Papua

DPRD

Parliament of the West Papua Province /
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah

DPRP

Papuan People's Representative Council /
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua

Foker LSM

Papua NGO Cooperation Forum /
Forum Kerja Sama Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat

FORERI

Forum for Reconciliation of the Irian Community /
Forum Rekonsiliasi Masyarakat Irian Jaya

FWPC

Free West Papua Campaign

KNPB

West Papua National Committee /
Komite Nasional Papua Barat

MRP

Papuan People Council / People's Consultative
Assembly / Majelis Rakyat Papua

OPM

Papua Freedom Organisation / Papua Freedom
Movement / Organisasi Papua Merdeka. Some
authors refer to them as the Papua Freedom
Organization and others as the Papua Freedom
Movement.

OTSUS

Special Autonomy Law No. 21/2001 /
Otonomi Khusus bagi Provinsi Papua

PDP

Papuan Presidium Council /
Presidium Dewan Papua

PPN

Papua Peace Network /
Jaringan Damai Papua

PVC

Papuan Volunteer Corps

UP4B

Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua
and West Papua / Unit Percepatan Pembangunan
Papua dan Papua Barat

WPNA

West Papua National Authority

Poso specific**GKST**

Central Sulawesi Christian Church /
Gereja Kristen Sulawesi Tengah

Malino I

Malino Peace Declaration /
Deklarasi Perdamaian Malino

POKJA-RKP

The task force for Poso conflict reconciliation /
Kelompok Kerja Resolusi Konflik Poso

PRKP

The Reconciliation Center for Poso conflict /
Pusat Resolusi Konflik dan Perdamaian

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Summary

Introduction

When President Soeharto fell from power in 1998 after 32 years of authoritarian rule, it marked the beginning of both Indonesia's democratic transition and the eruption of the violent internal conflicts that had been simmering across the country. Separatist agitation increased across Aceh, Papua and East Timor (now Timor Leste).¹ In the period from 1998 to 2003 (when most of the communal conflicts were resolved) this violence is estimated to have displaced more than a million people and led to the loss of thousands of lives. Post-Soeharto communal conflict resulted in 1.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs).²

Indonesia's dramatic democratic transition also had an impact on the ways in which conflict was (and is) managed. During the New Order era such conflict was systematically suppressed and not publicised for fear that it would trigger sentiments of 'ethnicity, religion and race among groups', commonly referred to as SARA (short for *suku*,

agama, *ras*, *antargolongan*). Indeed, it was this policy that was blamed for the outbreak of violent communal conflicts in the post-Soeharto era.³

Soeharto's successor, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, began the process of decentralising power from Jakarta and reducing the extensive reach of the military into political and economic life. This political transition remade the relationship between the state and society and offered both challenges and opportunities for peacemakers. Broad changes took place across Indonesia, from the increasing role of civil society in peacemaking to the changing relationship between the military and the police. These trends interacted with local grievances to produce a complex landscape of conflict that is still not well understood.

The research gap

The approaches to conflict management that have emerged in Indonesia post-Soeharto therefore deserve attention. Analysis of these issues (typically through academic research) has focused largely on the structural and proximate conflict drivers, the impact of these conflicts, and the actors involved: all of which offer important information for understanding the contours of grievances and violence. Yet there is remarkably little comparative policy-focused analysis of conflict management in Indonesia. This is striking given how frequently the country has experienced violent upheaval. Those responsible for conflict prevention and management lack access to timely comparative research on factors which enabled these violent conflicts to be settled, what potent issues remain and issues to consider for conflict resolution.

¹ The use of the word 'Papua' in this report refers to Papua and West Papua provinces. The area was previously known by various names, including Netherlands New Guinea (1895–1962), Western New Guinea (1962–May 1963), West Irian (1963–1973), Irian Jaya (1973–2000) and Papua (2001–2003). In 2003 the western-most third of the region was split into a separate province, called West Irian Jaya, which was renamed Western Papua province in April 2007. Indigenous people refer to Papua and West Papua provinces as West Papua.

² Varshney, Ashtosh et al., *Patterns of Collective Violence in Indonesia 1990–2003*, UNSFIR Working Paper 04/03, (Jakarta: United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery, 2004). On violence in Indonesia post-Soeharto, see also: Colombijn, Freek and Lindblad, Thomas J., "Introduction", In Colombijn, Freek and Lindblad, Thomas J., (Eds.), *Roots of Violence in Indonesia*, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2002). On the Maluku conflict, see: Sri, Yanuarti et.al., *Konflik di Maluku Tengah: Penyebab, Karakteristik, dan Penyelesaian Jangka Panjang*, (Jakarta: LIPI, 2003). On the Aceh conflict, see: Aspinall, Edward, "Violence and Identity Formation in Aceh under Indonesian Rule", In Anthony Reid (Ed.), *Verandah of Violence, The background to the Aceh problem* (Singapore: Singapore University Press and World Scientific Publishing Co Pty Ltd., (2006)

³ Gershman, John, "Indonesia: Islands of conflict", *Asia Times Online*, 26 October (2002).

In this light, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (the HD Centre), the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), the Institut Titian Perdamaian (ITP), and later Current Asia (CA), have worked together to fill this important information gap and produce policy relevant research which aims to inform future peacemaking efforts within Indonesia. In several areas the halting of violence has not necessarily dealt conclusively with the underlying causes of conflict, and issues that could stimulate conflict remain unaddressed such as the role of security forces; equitable resource allocation; and the ongoing sensitive issues of ethnic and religious identity.

This report includes three case studies on conflict management in Indonesia from Papua, Poso in Central Sulawesi and Maluku. Poso and Maluku were chosen as case studies to provide insights on, and lessons learned from, managing communal conflict. In both regions, the central government mediated agreements to end the violence in 2001 and 2002 respectively – but only after the conflict had been mismanaged for years. Research conducted for these reports indicates that today's peace remains fragile as root causes and new grievances emerging from the conflicts were not fully addressed. In the main, government-mediated peace agreements have not been fully implemented and many residents of Maluku or Poso appear poorly informed of the contents of these agreements. Issues such as the return of IDPs and land disputes between different ethnic or religious groups, remain significant sources of tension. To the extent that violence has been reduced, it is important to decipher which of the many initiatives taken by government and non-government actors were responsible for these changes. These studies ask how the conflict was managed? To what effect? And what peacemaking approaches can indeed be regarded as successful?

The case of Papua is even more pressing as the conflict is very much ongoing. The special autonomy law (OTSUS / *Otonomi Khusus bagi Provinsi Papua*) approved in 2001 was expected to reduce disparities between Papua and the Indonesian Government (GoI). It was also expected to give people in Papua, especially indigenous people, the chance to participate actively in development processes. However, because the law has been poorly implemented, it has ultimately fuelled further separatist sentiment. Papua also suffers from local conflicts among indig-

enous tribes, and more recently, tensions between indigenous people (often Christians) and settlers (often Muslims). The Papua section is both retrospective and forward looking, asking how the conflict can be de-escalated and who should be involved? As well as what obstacles and opportunities there are for peacemaking?

Methodology

With the support of the MacArthur Foundation through its Asia Security Initiative, the HD Centre, LIPI, ITP (and eventually CA) undertook a wide range of research. Support was also received from the International Development Research Centre.

Throughout 2009 and up to mid-2010 detailed primary research was undertaken in Maluku, Poso and Papua. The methodology for this research included focus group discussions, workshops and individual briefings. These were complemented by interviews with officials from the central government and non-government actors in Jakarta, as well as drawing on materials from secondary sources. An annotated bibliography containing selective material relevant to conflict management in Papua, Maluku and Poso was produced in early 2010.⁴ For more detail see Annex 1: Research methodology.

Significant issues in peace processes in Indonesia

Decentralization

Decentralisation and regional autonomy became a national priority during the period of *reformasi*.⁵ A number of laws introduced in 1999 shifted power away from the central government.⁶ The heads of regional governments, districts (*bupati*) and mayors (*walikota*) became elected positions for the first time. Decentralisation with its many positive and

4 Available at www.hdcentre.org/files/Indonesia%20Literature%20Review%20January%202010_o.pdf

5 The Post-Soeharto era in Indonesia began with the fall of Soeharto in 1998. Since then Indonesia has been in a period of transition. This era has been called the period of *reformasi* (reform).

6 These include Law No. 22/1999 on 'Regional Government' and Law No. 25/1999 on 'Financial balance between the Central and Regional Government'. These two national laws replaced previous national laws that regulated the administrative structure of regional governments, Law No. 5/1974 on Regional Government and Law No. 5/1979 on Village Government. The latter law had previously introduced the Javanese administrative structure for villages throughout Indonesia.

democratic benefits also led to major challenges. The local population, often referred to as 'sons of the soil' (*putra daerah*) were given priority for civil service positions in local government. Control of the civil service offered the power to allocate jobs, contracts and engage in corruption. Unsurprisingly then, those who controlled the bureaucracy under Soeharto (who were not necessarily from the local population) resented losing their privileged positions. Hence, there was sharp competition among elites, sometimes along ethnic lines, and divisions were sharpened between those considered locals and migrants.

These changes had a profound impact on conflict management. In many cases they engendered further confusion *within* government. The division of power between provincial and district government lacked clarity, and co-ordination in crisis situations was disjointed. Corruption became more prevalent because of the shift of financial power to local government, compounded by the lack of sound supervision and a strong central government to monitor the implementation of these new laws. Local administrators throughout Indonesia now have considerable power over the exploitation of resources.⁷

Such difficulties between provincial and district governments led the central government to reassert itself in late 2001 with the result that the central government stepped up its efforts for conflict resolution. Suffice to say, the post-Soeharto reform process is still a work in progress with the resulting decentralisation having implications for effective conflict resolution.

Consequently, the efforts of central government ministers – particularly Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla⁸ – led to the Malino peace declaration in Poso in December 2001 (Malino I) and the Malino peace agreement in Maluku and North Maluku in February 2002 (Malino II).⁹ Both Malino I and Malino II were perceived as political announcements to mark the end of conflict, but critically neither was a participatory process in which local

communities were involved in the planning or implementation of the agreements. These agreements were criticised for focusing on physical recovery, reconstruction and the provision of emergency aid to IDPs instead of addressing root causes. Among the major criticisms cited are: a lack of consultation with the local community on the peace agreements; members of the negotiating teams did not represent the needs of the locals; and the agreements did not address the structural causes of the conflicts. For example, resources and economic opportunities are still unequally distributed, and relocated IDPs have not been effectively re-integrated into their new environments.

Security forces

It was only during the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) that military reform started to be taken seriously. While the military, *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (TNI), and the police had been two branches of the Republic of Indonesia Armed Forces (ABRI) under Soeharto, by 2002 they had been separated as part of the process of security sector reform.¹⁰ On paper the police were tasked with internal security while the military was responsible for national defence. However, during this transition, the division of responsibilities and relations between the military and police were not clearly defined. There was also a degree of resistance from elements of the military, which has a long tradition of regarding the police as the inferior force. In practice, the military was still called upon for internal security duties where they had to work closely with the police. The military remained politically influential, especially in formulating national security policy. Moreover, while the military had

7 Richard, Seymour, and Turner, Sarah, "Otonomi daerah: Indonesia's decentralisation experiment", *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 4 (2002), pp.33-51.

8 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, 2002-2004; Jusuf Kalla, Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare, 2001-2004.

9 The Malino Declaration on Poso can be accessed at www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/ACOS-64BRC3?OpenDocument; Malino II Peace Agreement on Maluku can be accessed at www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/ACOS-64CDMA?OpenDocument.

10 Two pieces of legislation, Law No. 3/2002 on State Defense and Law No. 34/2004 on the Indonesian Armed Forces, constitute the most important laws in the reform of the security sector. The role and functions of the military and the police are then further defined in the following two new acts: according to the State Defence Act No. 2/2002, the TNI is "a defence instrument of the unitary Republic of Indonesia" (Article 10). Meanwhile, the National Police Act No. 2/2002 states that the police force is an instrument of the state responsible for guarding public security and order and tasked with protecting, guiding and serving the public as well as upholding the law. The Law No. 2/2002 also clearly stipulates that the Police are a civilian force responsible for internal security matters. For more information, see Sukma, Rizal and Prasetyono, Edy, "Security sector reform in Indonesia: The military and the police", *Working Paper 9*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael Conflict Research Unit (Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 2003).

experience handling separatist or anti-government violence, communal conflicts such as those in Maluku and Poso had no clear enemy and proved far harder to manage, requiring skills the military lacked. In recent years, the position of the police has improved, not least in terms of budgetary support.

The roles of women

Though women are often assumed to be victims in armed conflicts, women's roles in violent conflicts present a far more complex picture. For example, women's resilience – through their economic activities, care of family and children, and community networks – help prevent further societal disintegration in the midst of violence and insecurity.¹¹ In Indonesia this is certainly the case. Women also played important roles in informal reconciliation between the conflicting parties. Of course, women also played active roles in perpetrating violence as combatants, commanders, messengers and provocateurs.

In Ambon, Poso and Aceh, women led many inter-religious and peace dialogue processes at the grassroots level. Typically perceived as non-threatening (perhaps even powerless) by many in the community, they are often able to influence men and husbands to lay down their weapons. While women have played an extensive role in managing conflict at the community level in a variety of ways, their involvement in conflict resolution at higher political levels is minimal. For example, in the Helsinki agreement on Aceh, only one woman, an advisor to the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), was involved in the peace process.¹² Two women pastors from the Christian community and a Muslim woman participated in the Malino I process. In Malino II, a woman pastor and two Catholic women were chosen as representatives of the Christian community, and no women represented the Muslim community. In addition, the presence of these women in these peace talks did not necessarily mean issues of concern to women were brought to the table, as they had to submit to the

broader agenda of their male-dominated teams. Notably, not a single article in the Helsinki agreement and Malino agreements explicitly addresses gender issues.

Women's limited participation in peacemaking reflects broader gender challenges in Indonesia. Though the country has a strong matrilineal component to its traditional culture, this is mostly obscured by a narrow religious interpretation of women's roles in society. This conservative cultural context is exacerbated by a low level of awareness among women about their rights both at a national level and globally. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to encourage women to contribute to a higher political level of decision-making *and* for many (male) decision-makers to create or share political space to enable that to happen.¹³ As a result the process loses access to a wide range of perspectives and acute understanding of the stakes involved in the violent conflict.

Civil society

The record of representatives from civil society in resolving conflict in Indonesia has been mixed. In many cases, they are an important bridge to the central government. For example, the Papua Peace Network (PPN) is leading an internal dialogue among civil society groups to prepare for eventual talks on the future of Papua, and ensure that the views of civil society are well represented in a potential dialogue process.

Civil society representatives have also played an active role as peace and reconciliation actors at the grassroots level in the communal conflicts of Maluku and Central Sulawesi. In these conflicts, they were instrumental in delivering emergency aid to the IDPs and the affected communities. In addition, there were several initiatives from villagers to set up local mechanisms to prevent conflict. For example, in Wayame village in Maluku, villagers created 'Team 20' consisting of ten people from the Muslim community and ten people from the Christian community who were responsible for patrolling the village to ensure security and investigating any rumours circulating in the village with

11 Bell, Christine, "Women address the problems of peace agreements", In, Coomaraswamy, Radhika and Fonseka, Dilrukshi (Eds.), *Peace work: Women, armed conflict and negotiation*, (India: Women Unlimited, 2004).

12 The Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement is available at www.aceh-mm.org/download/english/Helsinki%20MoU.pdf

13 See, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, *Women at the Indonesian peace table: Enhancing the contributions of women to conflict resolution*, Report and policy recommendations with the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2010) available in Bahasa Indonesia and English at www.hdcentre.org/projects/gender-amp-mediation/issues/women-peace-table---asia-pacific.

the potential to incite conflict. Rules were also created and enforced in the village that included a prohibition on making derogatory remarks about other religions and being involved in violence. Any villagers found breaking the rules were punished accordingly or told to leave the village. Other civil society initiatives included providing education, income generation for women and trauma counselling.

However, Soeharto's authoritarian legacy limited civil society's ability to handle the challenging diversity of ethnic groups in Indonesia. His "unity" policy used a variety of legal and ideological methods to either curtail or regulate civil society, the most well-known of which was the 1985 Law on Social Organisations (*Undang-Undang Organisasi Kemasyarakatan* No. 8/1985, otherwise known as UU ORMAS). Under this law, all organisations had to adhere to the state ideology of *Pancasila*.¹⁴ With the removal of regulations controlling organisational activities in 1998, the number of NGOs and other civil society organisations increased at a rapid rate. However, many of these organisations are fragmented along sectoral lines with a lack of co-ordination between groups working on similar issues; many are weak organisationally; and there are very few mechanisms through which these organisations can be held accountable to the communities which they endeavour to help or claim to represent.

Observations

Though the conflicts in Maluku, Poso and Papua are clearly different from each other, there are a number of common themes worth reflecting on – not least because the conflict in Papua is ongoing and more needs to be done to ensure that peace in Maluku and Poso is sustained.

A clear common challenge has been the appropriate use of the security forces. Inexperienced in dealing with communal conflicts, the initial security response in Maluku and Poso exacerbated tensions. The security forces aligned themselves with different sides in the conflict, allegedly supplying arms and failing to arrest those who clearly violated the law. In Papua, human rights abuses by security

agencies and competition between them for control over natural resources has led to increased mistrust against the central government as well as migrants. However, at the same time, the lesson from Maluku and Poso is that when the security forces are seen to enforce the law fairly and arrest those known to be instigating violence, conflict can be reduced.

Funds for development and humanitarian assistance should not be seen as a panacea. As violence escalated in Maluku and Poso, the central government and NGOs focused on providing emergency aid, particularly to those displaced. While this was an essential humanitarian response, it was only when the central government began to address more fundamental drivers of the conflict that violence subsided. Similarly in Papua, relying on development projects – which suffer from corruption and poor co-ordination within government – has failed to calm separatist sentiment. Indeed, uneven development is a conflict driver. This lesson applies equally to post-violence measures. Money was allocated in Maluku and Poso to rebuilding infrastructure at the expense of reconciliation and re-integration of the conflicting parties. Such intangibles are harder to address but essential for a lasting peace. Economic wellbeing should not be regarded as a substitute for political dialogue.

These case studies also ask difficult questions about who is responsible for managing conflicts in Indonesia, reflecting an ongoing debate in government circles where there should be attempts to frame conflict management in a national law. District and provincial governments have occasionally been constructive but once violence escalates beyond a certain point, the central government needs to step in – either as a facilitator of dialogue in a communal context, or a participant in dialogue if they are party to the conflict.

Better co-ordination within government is also needed. Competition between provincial and district governments in Maluku and Poso weakened attempts to manage the conflict. In the case of Papua, while the Papua Desk of the Coordinating Ministry for Legal, Political and Security Affairs has the formal mandate to deal with the region, at times other agencies like the Ministry of Home Affairs exercise greater power.

Civil society representatives – whether from the NGO or religious community – have an important role in prodding reluctant state authorities to take action. It took a Christian leader, Pastor Tubondo,

¹⁴ Pancasila consists of five principles: Belief in the one and only God; just and civilised humanity; unity of Indonesia; democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations amongst representatives; and, social justice for all.

to persuade Jusuf Kalla to help mediate the conflict in Poso. In Papua, LIPI has built up support within government for dialogue starting with its 2008 proposal *The Papua Road Map*.¹⁵ This has been complemented by the work of a Papuan Catholic pastor, Father Neles Tebay, who has promoted dialogue within the Papuan community and with the central government in Jakarta. In all this, public participation is critical. Peace in Maluku and Poso is less secure than it could be because the Malino I and II agreements were elite agreements made without any involvement of the public – a lesson which should be heeded by those involved in dialogue in Papua.

15 Widjojo, Muridan, (Ed.), *Papua Road Map: Negotiating the Past, Improving the Present and Securing the Future*, (Jakarta: YOI, Yayasan TIFA, LIPI, 2009).

Case Study One

Conflict and violence in Maluku: Resolution and management approaches

Introduction

The violent conflict in Maluku, largely concentrated in Ambon, was one of the most devastating to break out after the fall of the Soeharto regime. The conflict claimed almost 5,000 lives from 1999 to 2002 and displaced a third of the population of Maluku and North Maluku.¹⁶ Before the outbreak of the religious communal conflict in Ambon city, there were several inter-religious skirmishes in other parts of Indonesia. In November 1998, riots broke out in Ketapang, north Jakarta, between Christian Ambonese *preman*, or thugs, and Muslims. It was reported that after the riots, almost 200 Ambonese *preman* were shipped back to Maluku by the Indonesian Navy. According to witnesses in Ambon, the *preman* acted as provocateurs of the first outbreak of violence.¹⁷ In December 1998, in several areas in Ambon, fights and arson attacks occurred between Christian and Muslim villages, often triggered by the Indonesian Military (TNI). On January 14, 1999, there were riots between Christians and Muslims in Dobo in southeast Maluku.

The most frequently cited trigger to the conflict in Ambon is the event on 19 January 1999 during the Muslim holiday of Idul Fitri. A petty dispute broke out between a Christian youth from Mardika, a district in Ambon city, and a Muslim youth from Batumerah, a village next to Mardika. Rumours that exacerbated pre-existing divisions between Christian and Muslim communities began, drawing surrounding villages into the violence. Initially, fighting was mainly between Ambon Christians and Muslim immigrants from South Sulawesi (Bugis, Buton and Makassar), with each launching surprise attacks against the other.¹⁸

Conflict drivers

The conflict in Maluku is often portrayed in terms of longstanding animosities between Muslims and Christians, although the reality is more complex. As a result of European involvement in the spice trade in the 16th century, nearly half of the Maluku population today are Christians (50.2 percent according to the 2000 census); compared to the rest of Indonesia where 88 per cent of the population is Muslim. More than 300 years of Dutch colonialism divided Maluku society along religious lines, both geographically and socially.¹⁹ Traditional practices are thought to have kept tensions between Christians and Muslims in a relatively stable state until the 1970s.²⁰ *'Pela – Gandong'*, a village alliance system

16 Brown, Graham., Wilson, Christopher and Hadi, Suprayoga., "Overcoming Violent Conflict: Peace and Development Analysis in Maluku and North Maluku", Vol. 4, Bappenas, (Jakarta: United Nations Development Programme and Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, 2005).


17 Van Klinken, Gerry, "What caused the Ambon violence?", *Inside Indonesia*, No.60 (1999). See also: Aditjondro, "Di Balik Asap Mesiu, Air Mata dan Anyir Darah di Maluku", In Salampessy, Zairin and Husain, Thamrin (Eds.), *Ketika Semerbak Cengkih Tergusur Asap Mesiu*, (Jakarta: TAPAK Ambon, 2001).

18 Panggabean, Samsu, "Maluku: The Challenge of Peace", In van Deveen, Hans (Ed.), *Searching for Peace in Asia Pacific*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publication, 2004).

19 International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku*, Asia Report No. 10, (Jakarta / Brussels: ICG, 2000).

20 Bartels, Dieter, "Your God is No Longer Mine: Muslim-Christian Fratricide in the Central Moluccas after a Half-Millennium of Tolerant Co-Existence and Ethnic Unity", In Pannell, Sandra (Ed.), *A State of Emergency: Violence, Society and the State in Eastern Indonesia*, (Darwin: Northern Territory University Press, 2003).

Figure 1: Map of Maluku



Courtesy of the UN OCHA Regional Office for Asia-Pacific, 2011.

unique to the Central Maluku, bound Muslim and Christian villages together and played a pivotal role in traditional social relationships and the experience of cultural identity.

Maluku underwent many social changes during Soeharto's rule. The apparent peaceful relationship between Christians and Muslims was only superficial. Dutch colonialism led to Christians being granted greater access to education and political office, while Muslims made up the majority of traders and business people. Following the government policy of transmigration that began in 1950s, and voluntary migration from Bugis, Buton and Makassar that grew in the 1970s, the population of Maluku became increasingly Muslim. In 1990, Soeharto founded the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia*, or ICMI) as a means of securing political support from Islamic groups as his power within the military faded. Soeharto intended ICMI to be a counterbalance to the military. The ICMI became an increasingly important source of individuals for important

government positions, including in Maluku. In 1992, M. Akib Latuconsina, ICMI director in Maluku was appointed governor. He was the first native Malukan and the first civilian to hold the post, which was usually occupied by military officers from Java. By 1996 all of the *bupati*, or district chiefs, in the province were Muslims. These changes antagonised the Christian population and further divided Maluku along religious lines.

Evolution of the conflict

In the early stage of the conflict, the target of violence were Muslim migrants from Bugis, Buton and Makassar, a group whose dominant position in the employment market and informal labour sector (e.g. market merchants) generated resentment. After the large-scale exodus of those migrants, the conflict spread to other parts of Maluku and became more overtly religious. The flare up of violence was aggravated by rumours surrounding religious symbols such as attacks on mosques and churches.

Box 1: The chronology of the conflict in Maluku

1999	January	Small scale street fights escalate into riots in Ambon city and its surroundings.
	March	Mass violence spreads to other islands in Maluku.
	May	The general election campaign begins and violence declines.
	June	General election.
	July	Mass violence restarts in Ambon city.
	October	North Maluku Province separated from Maluku Province.
	December	Conflict escalates after Silo church is burned and a massacre takes place in the Muslim village of Tobelo in North Maluku.
2000	May	Laskar Jihad arrives in Ambon.
	June	Massacre in Galela near Tobelo in North Maluku. Police weapons stolen and distributed to civilians. Civil emergency declared in Maluku and North Maluku and thousands of troops deployed.
	December	Maluku Front Sovereignty (FKM) declares independence of the "Republic of South Maluku" (RMS).
2001	January	The army's joint battalion (Yongab) conducts a 'sweeping operation' targeting strongholds of Muslim groups.
	June	Yongab conducts another "sweeping operation".
2002	February	Malino Peace Agreement (Malino II) was signed.
	April	The Malukan provincial government office was burned. Soya village is attacked, after which violence began to decline in Maluku.
	May	The leader of Laskar Jihad, Ja'far Umar Talib, and the FKM, Alex Manuputti, both arrested.
	October	Laskar Jihad is dissolved in Maluku.
2003	May	Civil emergency lifted from North Maluku province.
	September	Civil emergency lifted from Maluku Province.
2004	April	FKM raised the RMS flag, prompting riots in Ambon city which left 40 dead.
	June	General election.


Women and children were also involved in the violence, quickly learning to make spears, machetes, arrows, and bombs.²¹

The conflict in Maluku subsided in May 1999 as attention shifted to the start of the general election campaign. The Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle (PDI-P) won the election in Ambon. The PDI-P was a reformulation of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) that fused five political parties, including the Indonesian Christian Party (PARKINDO). Historically, PARKINDO was supported by the Ambonese Christian community and hence PDI-P was perceived as “the Christian party” in Maluku. Violence re-erupted in Ambon

in July 1999 when PDI-P's election victory was announced. Maluku was on the brink of a civil war. People mobilised to defend their religion and orchestrated violence against anyone of a different religion. Many villages took part in the fighting. The security forces were also divided along religious lines and were therefore unable to perform their tasks competently. The peak of the conflict was the attack on Silo Church and Tobelo massacre on 26 December, 1999.²² The Silo church in the centre of Ambon city was one of the biggest Maluku Protestant Churches (*Gereja Protestan Maluku*, or GPM) and was burnt to the ground the day after Christmas. The same day, almost 800 Muslims in the mosque at Tobelo village in North Maluku province were

²¹ Interview by Akiko Horiba with the Director of LAPPAN (Institute of Woman and Children Empowerment), Ambon City, 17 November 2009.

²² International Crisis Group (2000).



An Indonesian soldier stands guard above a village destroyed by fighting between Muslims and Christians in Ambon, January 14, 2000.
© AP Photo/Achmad Ibrahim

killed by Christians. Those attacks were in turn used to call on Christians and Muslims to engage in further violent conflict, which the military could do little to contain.

During this period, many villages were attacked, churches and mosques destroyed, and civilians killed and displaced. The inability of the Indonesian central government and military to control the conflict gave groups outside Maluku the opportunity to exploit the situation. On 7 January 2000, after the massacre in Tobelo, more than 100,000 Muslims held a protest in Jakarta at *Lapangan Monas* (National Monument Stadium), calling for a *jihad* in Maluku. The protest was organised by Muslim political parties and Muslim organisations. One of the Muslim organisations, called *Forum Komunikasi Ahlu Sunnah wal-Jama'ah* (FKAWJ) led by Ja'far Umar Thalib, held a large meeting at Senayan Stadium on

6 April 2000 and created 'Laskar Jihad', a Muslim militia group.²³ In May 2000, this Java-based Muslim militia announced they were launching a *jihad* in Maluku and began sending its members to the province. They stole more than 800 weapons from a police weapons store in June 2000 and subsequently committed frequent attacks on police officers. Both Laskar Jihad and the military supplied weapons to Muslim civilians, which allowed the conflict to escalate. The dynamics of the conflict changed significantly, with more Christian than Muslim villages attacked. A state of civil emergency was declared on 27 June 2000 and a large military contingent

²³ For more information on Laskar Jihad, see Noorhaidi, Hasan, "Faith and Politics: The Rise of the Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia", *Indonesia*, Vol. 73, April, (2002), pp.145-170.

deployed in Maluku – at the time there were 17 army battalions and two battalions of paramilitary police – though neither the army nor the police were successful in controlling the situation.²⁴

The Government's inability to contain the conflict allowed for the emergence of Maluku Front Sovereignty (FKM) in 2000, a movement which drew upon the legacy of the Republic of South Maluku (RMS). RMS was formed in 1950 and advocated separatism from a predominantly Muslim state.²⁵ The RMS was thus perceived as a Christian movement exacerbating the inter-religious dynamics of the conflict.

A number of factors contributed to the decline in violence by the end of 2001. Prolonged attacks had segregated communities, making it more logistically difficult for Muslims and Christians to attack each other. A special joint battalion, Yongab, made up of special forces from the army, navy and air force, conducted operations primarily against Laskar Jihad, including against their base. Finally, Malukans often say they simply grew tired of the fighting.

The central government initiated peace talks between the Christian and Muslim communities which, in February 2002, culminated in the Malino II peace agreement. Sporadic violence and bombing continued (including attacks on the regional parliament and the governor's office) but decreased in frequency and intensity so much that the state of civil emergency was lifted in Maluku in 2003.

Another important turning point was the attack in April 2002 on the village of Soya, in which 11 people died and 22 houses were bombed.²⁶ Residents of Soya were Christians and had presumed that they were safe from attack because of their distance from Muslim communities. An investigation revealed that Kopassus (TNI special forces) and a Christian

gang committed the attack, not Muslims as had been previously assumed.²⁷ According to many observers, Kopassus tried to extend the conflict by hiring a Christian gang to conduct the attack. Indeed, Bertu Loupatty, one of the leaders of the Christian *preman*, confessed that the Soya attack was in fact a Kopassus order.²⁸ This gave Christians and Muslims a common cause in their resentment of the army. A shared sense of victimhood decreased the level of communal conflict.

Later incidents did not spark mass violence in the same way as they had in the past. In April 2004, more than 40 people died in rioting following the raising of the RMS flag at the home of the FKM leader.²⁹ Rioting erupted again in Ambon city but subsided within one week. Following this riot, minor bombings occurred but did not provoke a violent reaction from the local community.

Conflict management actors and initiatives

Various efforts were undertaken to end the conflict, including those led by security forces; central and local government; international and local NGOs; and local community and women's groups. Two broad approaches to conflict management in Maluku emerge from these efforts: the security and emergency approach; and the recovery and development approach. Conflict management before the Malino Peace Agreement in February 2002 (Malino II) was mostly reactive. There was no strategic or long-term planning by either the Government nor civil society. The main conflict management tools used were the delivery of aid and security, relying heavily on the military which had been mobilised from outside Maluku. Malino II was a significant turning point which marked a shift to the recovery and development approach. After the Malino II peace process, the central and local government turned to legal instruments – arresting and prosecuting those holding weapons and committing attacks – and focused on long-term development and

24 All figures in this paragraph on the number of security personnel are sourced from: Yanuarti, Sri., Nusa Bhakti, Ikrar and Nurhasim, Mochamad, *Military Politics, Ethnicity and Conflict in Indonesia*, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, Working Paper No. 62 (2009).

25 The FKM was formed on 15 July 2000 by Alex Manuputti in Kudamati, Ambon. It was initially formed to boost the morale of the locals at the height of the conflict when the role of the state was weak. However, it did not receive much local support, with only several hundred active members among the province's population. This prompted Alex Manuputti to use the old political flag of RMS to front the FKM. The Republic of the South Moluccas (RMS) was promoted by the Dutch to undermine opposition to its colonial rule immediately after World War II. It was a predominantly Christian organisation and advocated for Maluku to be separated from the Republic of Indonesia.

26 *Sinar Harapan*, "Belasan Preman Pelaku Pengeboman di Ambon," 22 October, (2002).

27 Muhammad, Najib, *Security sector reform, democratic transition, and social violence: The case of Ambon, Indonesia*, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2004).

28 Muhammad, Najib (2004), p.8.

29 International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Violence Erupts Again in Ambon*, Asia Report No.32, (Jakarta/Brussels: ICG, 2004).

recovery planning. Civil society also shifted their approach from the provision of emergency assistance to development and recovery.

The emergency and security approach to conflict management

Government initiatives Pre-Malino II

Before the Government initiated the Malino peace talks, there were several unsuccessful attempts at conflict resolution by the local government. For example, the Maluku Governor set up an informal team of religious leaders, 'Team 6', at the end of January 1999. The team was composed of six leaders from the Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant communities. Their mandate was to prevent the destruction of churches, mosques and homes, and to stop widespread violence in Ambon city. However, the leaders selected by the Governor were not seriously committed to peace – indeed, some suspect that they were even complicit in the violence. In addition, given the decentralised decision-making structure within the Muslim community, it was difficult to select representatives with genuine authority across Maluku. Unsurprisingly, Team 6 had no effect on conflict resolution or management.

Aid distribution was also problematic. The local government had stocks of food supplies and other basic necessities but could not distribute it without military support. However, the reliance on the military to distribute the aid often led to its disappearance. There were claims that the military itself had no proper logistical support. The breakdown of the structure of government during the conflict meant there was no leadership to provide directives on where and how the distribution of emergency aid should be carried out. The segregation of Muslim and Christian communities posed a further challenge to the distribution of the aid.

The Government attempted to respond militarily to the growing violence. During the early stages of the conflict, between January and March 1999, the Government deployed 5,300 security personnel, both from the mobile brigade (*Brimob*) of the police and from the military, to Maluku. On May 15, 1999 the Maluku District Military Command (*Korem Maluku*) was upgraded to a Regional Military Command (*Kodam*) under the leadership of a brigadier general, a move which gave the military both greater status and a greater budget in Maluku. In

November 1999 the number of security personnel was increased to 6,000, including officers from the new Regional Military Command (*Kodam*). In January 2000, the military and *Brimob* forces were increased to five battalions (11,250 personnel).³⁰ However, this increased force did not lead to a decline in violence, not least because of the military's inexperience with communal conflict. The military was not trained for conflicts in which the concept of the enemy was ambiguous and did not know what actions to take when the two religious communities were engaged in fighting.

In June 2000, rising violence, driven by the infiltration of Laskar Jihad, led to a civil emergency being declared in Maluku and even more police and military troops being deployed to the province. However, poor civil-military co-ordination proved to be a significant barrier to reducing the level of violence. According to the law that governs emergency rule (Law 23/1959), it is the responsibility of governors to restore order in an emergency situation and they have the authority to use the resources at their disposal. However, neither the Governor nor the district head in Maluku was able to command the security forces, who worked only under the direction of their central command. While there was some degree of co-ordination between the security forces and local government, it was not sufficient for both to respond effectively and promptly to emergency situations. The civil emergency in north Maluku province lasted until May 2003 and the civil emergency lasted until September 2003 in Maluku province.

Security forces: in-fighting between the military and police

There were significant co-ordination problems within the security forces, particularly between the military and the police.³¹ The ineffectiveness of the police and military stems in part from the structural changes that these agencies underwent during the transition to democracy. The reforms that followed Soeharto stepping down gave the police the responsibility for internal security and greater

³⁰ All figures in this paragraph on the number of security personnel are sourced from: Yanuarti, Sri et al (2009).

³¹ Muhammad, Nazib, 'Violence in Between', In Kingsbury, Damien (Ed.), *Conflict and Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia*, Monash Asia Institute (Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 2005).

resources than they had previously, but the military continued to assert its primacy, seeking to retain both its authority and budget. So, while the division of labour and relations between the military and police was defined on paper, in reality it was more fluid. Indeed, there was even active fighting between the TNI (military) and *Polri* (police). In July 2000, an exchange of weapons fire took place between personnel from Battalion 509 (*Kodam Diponegoro* and *Kodam Brawijaya*) and personnel from *Brimob* in which at least one police officer died.³²

While the division of labour and relations between the military and police was defined on paper, in reality it was more fluid.

The perceived partiality of the security forces in events such as the attack on Soya village bred distrust amongst locals – and though such involvement has been officially denied by both the military and the police, the results of various investigations suggest otherwise.³³ The police stationed in Maluku were mainly locally recruited and, unsurprisingly, demonstrated affiliations with their respective fellow Muslims and Christians. As for the military units, although they were deliberately mixed and regularly rotated from one area to the other, soldiers became acquainted with the villagers they defended and were often given food, drinks and cigarettes by those villagers. It was not unusual, when clashes took place, for the soldiers to side with the people they had been meeting on a daily basis with the result that Muslim soldiers sometimes defended Muslim villages against Christian attacks and Christian soldiers defended their friends against Muslim attacks.³⁴ In the second phase of the Maluku conflict, some military personnel were even supplying weapons and ammunition to the warring parties.³⁵ Soldiers were said to have paid for their food with bullets and, according to an Ambonese member of the People's Representative Council (DPR): *“The ammunition and guns are sold by soldiers who need money to live.”*³⁶

32 Yanuarti, Sri et al (2009), p.26.

33 TAPOL, *KOPASSUS and the Maluku Crisis*, Online bulletin, January-February (2003).

34 International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: The search for peace in Maluku*, Asia Report No. 31, (Jakarta/Brussels: ICG 2002).

35 Yanuarti, Sri et al (2009), p.25.

36 International Crisis Group (2002), p.5.

Extortion by the security forces also tarnished their reputation in Maluku. At the peak of the conflict, neither religious leaders nor government representatives could pass through areas dominated by one religious group without protection from the security forces. As the Secretary of Ambon City put it: *“If I wanted to make a visit, I needed to ask security forces to accompany me. Without their protection, I could not have gone anywhere during the conflict”*³⁷. Security personnel exploited the situation, demanding protection money in return for safe passage. One resident complained that to travel back and forth from Ambon city to visit his family “security forces sometimes asked me to pay a very expensive price. I paid because there was no other option. . . the security forces benefited from the conflict.”³⁸

The non-governmental sector

As the local government was unable to operate during the emergency period, international and local NGOs attempted to fill the vacuum. NGOs were critical providers of humanitarian aid, predominantly sanitation, medical care and basic necessities particularly to the IDPs. As donors and international NGOs had difficulty accessing conflict-affected areas, local NGOs played an important role in the distribution of the aid. Following the riot in January 1999, local NGOs in Ambon created a consortium called the Maluku Social Humanitarian Voluntary Team (*Tim Relawan Kemanusiaan Social Maluku*, TIRUS), which operated out of a Catholic NGO's office.

Prior to the conflict, there were approximately ten NGOs in Ambon and they often transcended religious differences. However, the conflict produced religiously segregated local NGOs, each providing aid to their respective communities. Aid was provided less according to a systematic assessment of needs and more to areas where particular NGOs could gain access.

In the period before the Malino agreement was signed, international NGOs and UN agencies particularly focused on humanitarian aid rather than any peacebuilding activities.³⁹ As well as providing assistance to communities directly, they funded

37 Interview by Akiko Horiba with a former secretary of Ambon City, 16 July 2009.

38 Interview by Akiko Horiba with residents of Kebon Cengkeh, Ambon City, 1 September 2009.

39 Brown, Graham et al (2005).



Ambonese demand the UN intervene in renewed fighting between Christians and Muslims in Jakarta, May 22, 2000.
© REUTERS/Darren Whiteside

local NGOs and ran capacity-building programmes to improve local governance. Efforts were made to try and provide an incentive for religious co-operation. For example, the UNDP's Community Recovery Program provided funds to local NGOs on the condition that Christian and Muslim NGOs collaborate.⁴⁰ However, local government officials claimed that international organisations did not co-ordinate their activities with them, which led to overlapping assistance in IDP camps.⁴¹

Efforts from the local community to resolve the conflict

Before the arrival of emergency aid in Ambon from the central government and international

agencies, local communities relied heavily on their religious institutions for assistance. As the residents of Warigin in Ambon city put it: *"We assisted and supported one another by sharing food supplies and other basic necessities, and accepting IDPs into our houses. No one helped us for a long time. We survived by ourselves until emergency aid came."*⁴² Among Christian communities, the churches functioned as distribution centres for emergency aid.⁴³ Help within Muslim communities was less institutionalised, with mosques functioning as little more than a shelter for Muslims.

At this stage of the conflict, 'peace' was considered a taboo word within most communities. Those who talked of 'peace' were often treated as enemies, limiting their ability to start peace processes. Nevertheless, there were several examples of success-

40 Interview by Akiko Horiba with former staff of Lakspesdam NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), Ambon City, 20 July 2009.

41 Interview by Akiko Horiba with former staff of Bapedda (*Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah*) Province Maluku, Ambon City, 21 July 2009.

42 Focus group discussion with inhabitants of Warigin in Ambon City, 20 November 2009.

43 Interview by Akiko Horiba with a pastor at Silo church in Ambon City, 16 July 2009.

ful conflict prevention at the grassroots level. A strong example is the case of ‘Team 20’ in Wayame village, which maintained peaceful co-existence between both its Christians and Muslims villagers.⁴⁴ Team 20, which was composed of ten Christians and ten Muslims, was responsible for verifying any information aimed at provoking fighting between the two religious communities. They also enforced rules in the village prohibiting villagers from taking part in the fighting, misusing religious symbols, consuming alcohol and making derogatory remarks about religion. Both the pastors and Muslim religious leaders played a critical role in promoting religious tolerance, constantly telling the local community that it was not a conflict of religion. Team 20 also created a market that was accessible to both religious communities. This not only demonstrated the harmonious relations between the Christians and Muslims but was also important for the economic survival of the village during the conflict.

The *Baku Bae* Peace Movement was another notable conflict management initiative that helped to forge a common identity between both groups, as victims of violence. ‘*Baku Bae*’ is a phrase indigenous to Maluku which is commonly used by children to restore friendship after a misunderstanding or quarrel. In the context of Maluku’s conflict, ‘*Baku Bae*’ means ceasing the violence.⁴⁵ It was a more accepted term than “peace” at the height of the conflict. The movement was developed and built by a number of civil society actors in Ambon including scholars, NGO activists, lawyers, journalists, religious representatives, and village and traditional leaders (*raja*). It was facilitated by peace activists from Jakarta. Human rights NGOs from Jakarta, such as the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (*Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia*, YLBHI), Jakarta Legal Aid Institute (LBH Jakarta) and the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (*Kontras*), that supported the *Baku Bae* movement conducted research in Ambon and concluded the conflict was less about inherent religious

differences and more about the military’s negative role in exploiting religious sentiment. These NGOs then held a series of workshops in Jakarta in 2001 for Maluku religious leaders, village heads, *adat* leaders, NGO activists, lawyers and journalists that addressed the causes of the conflict and explored ways to forge a common agenda. These workshops, and the research undertaken by the human rights NGOs from Jakarta, helped engender a shift from “*looking at each other as enemies and fighting each other to all being victims and blaming the government.*”⁴⁶

One of the achievements of the workshops was to establish the Maluku Media Centre (MMC) which housed Christian and Muslim journalists who had been trained in *Baku Bae* workshops. Upon their return to Ambon, they spread the idea of peace journalism and encouraged other journalists to avoid writing or reporting provocative news.⁴⁷

Role of the media

In conflict situations, the media can be used as a peacebuilding tool as well as an instigator of violence. During the conflict in Ambon city, the media (newspapers, radio and the internet) played a part in promoting the violence. In addition, the media were divided along religious lines and were used to disseminate rumours and false information. For example, the conflict led to the division of a local newspaper, *Suara Maluku*, into *Suara Maluku* (for a Christian audience) and the *Ambon Express* (for Muslims). Provocative information that was not verified was often published in both papers. The radio and the internet had also triggered violence during the Ambon conflict. Laskar Jihad had its own radio station *Suara Perjuangan Muslim Maluku* (Maluku Muslim Voice of Struggle) and website (www.laskarjihad.or.id), which allegedly became a tool for mobilising Muslims to carry out violent attacks and spreading the group’s propaganda about the conflict. Christians and Muslims also criticised each other’s cruel killings and arson attacks on the internet.⁴⁸

44 Comments on the workshop by former pastor in Wayame village, one of the leaders of Team 20, Ambon City, 14 October 2009. Also see, Horiba, Akiko, “Community Mechanism in Wayame on Ambon Conflict”, In, *People’s Survival Strategy: Success Stories in Conflict (Poso, Tangkura village and Ambon, Wayame Village)*, Research Report, (Jakarta: Institut Titian Perdamaian, 2008).

45 Ichsan, Malik, *Bakubae: the community based movement for reconciliation process in Maluku*, Bakubae Maluku, Tifa Foundation and Yayasan Kemala, (Jakarta: Bakubae Maluku, Tifa and Kemala, 2003).

46 Interview by Akiko Horiba with a former vice director of YLBHI (*Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia / The Legal Aid Foundation Indonesia*), Jakarta, 22 August 2009.

47 Interview by Akiko Horiba with a journalist from *Televisi Republik Indonesia / TV Indonesia*, Ambon City, 1 September 2009.

48 See: Brauchler, Birgit, “Cyberidentities at War: Religion, Identity, and the Internet in the Moluccas Conflict”, *Indonesia*, No. 75 (New York: Columbia University, 2003), pp.123-151.

There are some examples of the media being used as a peacebuilding tool during the conflict. The *Baku Bae* peace movement held workshops to raise awareness of the importance of ending the violence in Maluku as well as workshops for journalists on peace journalism training and subsequently created the MMC. It was comprised of both Muslim and Christian journalists and became a way for them to exchange and verify information with their counterparts from across the religious divide, which had previously been impossible. This resulted in more objective reporting of the conflict.⁴⁹

Roles of women

*“Women occupy an influential role in the family. As wives, women can persuade their husbands not to engage in the conflict and as mothers, women can educate their children not to be prejudiced against other religions.”*⁵⁰

Women played active roles in peacemaking efforts in Ambon. Inter-religious meetings among women IDPs not only ensured the distribution of emergency aid to IDPs, but also became an avenue for reconciliation between the Muslim and Christian women. Women’s leadership in organizing inter-religious meetings among displaced women was a notable achievement in Maluku. The shared identity of ‘motherhood’ was an entry point for inter-religious discussions. Expressing shared concerns about their children’s safety and future, food, education, medical care and other basic necessities, helped bind women from the two religious communities together: *“Women create a culture of peace. Women can ease the tension through singing and dancing. Women have a big role to play in conflict management,”* concluded one activist.⁵¹

Women, however, were most active at the grassroots level. One strong example is the Caring Women’s Movement (*Gerakan Perempuan Peduli*, GPP) formed in September 1999 by more than 40 Muslim, Protestant and Catholic women activists. They organised rallies against violence in Maluku even when the conflict was at its peak. They also had meetings

with government and security officials, religious leaders and youths, as well as training women volunteers in the field on mediation and counselling. GPP also co-operated with other women’s organisations in Maluku.

There was less participation by women in formal high-level peacemaking in Maluku. For Malino II, a female pastor and two Catholic women were chosen as representatives of the Christian community, while there were no Muslim women representatives. The difference is partly because, while women pastors or Catholic nuns played a significant role as leaders of the Christian community, the role of women in the Muslim community was less visible.

Although some women in Ambon were involved in bomb-making and instigating violence, spontaneous women’s initiatives mostly brought about many positive results. In Ambon, the reconciliation process between women from the two religious communities began at the market. Women, both Muslims and Christians, regularly braved the violence to travel to the market, often located in Ambon city, to purchase food items or to sell their produce. For example, women known as *jibu-jibu*, travelled from the Muslim village of Sirisori to the Christian village of Owu to sell their produce, even during the conflict.⁵² Their efforts were aided by the perception that women are less threatening, making it easier for them to enter and travel through areas dominated by the other religion. While these efforts may have been driven more by basic needs than conscious attempts at conflict resolution, they laid the foundation for more formal reconciliation initiatives. In addition, due to interaction between the women from different religious communities, they became messengers for their larger communities. This put them in a good position to verify or dispel rumours and prevent acts of provocation.⁵³

The Malino Peace Agreement

The central government led the peace process – very short by comparative standards – that culminated in the signing of the Malino II peace agreement on 11 February 2002 in the highlands of Malino in

49 For more information on the MMC, refer to www.malukumedia.org/

50 Interview by Akiko Horiba with a Christian representative to the Malino Peace Agreement, Ambon, 31 August 2009.

51 Interview by Akiko Horiba with a Christian representative to the Malino Peace Agreement, Ambon, 31 August 2009.

52 Interview by Akiko Horiba with a women’s rights activist from Komnas HAM (National Human Rights Commission) in Ambon, 17 November 2009.

53 For more information on the role of women in the Maluku peace process, see Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, (2010).

Box 2: The Malino II Agreement

The Malino II Agreement comprised of 11 points:

1. End all conflicts and disputes;
2. Abide by due process of law enforcement. Existing security officers are obliged to be professional in exercising their mission;
3. Reject and oppose all kinds of separatist movements, among others the Republic of South Moluccas (RMS);
4. The people of the Moluccas have the right to stay and work legally and fairly in Indonesia nationwide and vice versa;
5. Ban and disarm illegal armed organizations, groups, or militias, in accordance with the existing law. Outside parties that disturb the peace will be expelled from the Moluccas;
6. Establish a national independent investigation team to investigate among others, the tragic incident on January 19, 1999, the Moluccas Sovereign Front, Republic of South Moluccas, Christian Republic of South Moluccas, jihad warrior (laskar jihad), Christ Warrior, coercive conversion, and human rights violations;
7. Call for the voluntary return of refugees to their homes, and the return of properties;
8. Rehabilitate mental, social, economic and public infrastructures, particularly educational, health, religious, and housing facilities;
9. To preserve law and order for the people in the area, it is absolutely necessary for the military and the police to maintain coordination and firmness in executing their function and mission. In line with this, a number of military and police facilities must be rebuilt and re-equipped;
10. Uphold good relationships and the harmony among all elements of believers in the Moluccas, all efforts of evangelism must highly honour the diversity and acknowledge local culture;
11. Support the rehabilitation of Pattimura University for common progress, as such, the recruitment system and other policies will be transparently implemented based on the principle of fairness while upholding the necessary standard.

Adapted from: The Moluccas agreement in Malino (Malino II) signed to end conflict and create peace in the Moluccas, Press and Information, The Embassy of Republic of Indonesia, Available at: www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/ACOS-64CDMA?OpenDocument.

South Sulawesi. See Box 2: The Malino II Agreement. Two figures in the central government were instrumental in bringing it about: the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and Jusuf Kalla, the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare. Jusuf Kalla asked the Governor of Maluku to select one representative each from the Muslim and Christian communities. These two representatives then selected a larger group from their communities – 35 Muslims and 34 Christians – and all 69 gathered in Malino for three days. A draft agreement was prepared by the central government, reviewed and edited on day two of the meeting, and signed on day three.

Unsurprisingly, such a rapid process did not allow for much engagement between the representatives of the Muslim and Christian communities (they even stayed at different hotels in Malino), nor for between the representatives and their supposed constituents. Religious leaders were not part of the public consultation, which left some communities feeling that their supposed representative did not represent their views. The Muslim community did not have an obvious leader and there was no clearly defined hierarchy within the mosques. Questions regarding the legitimacy of the Muslim representatives came to a head with the burning of the house of the leader of the Muslim negotiation team after the agreement was signed. While the central and local governments were concerned with achieving balanced representation, they did not pay adequate attention to who the representatives on each side were and whether they had the capacity and authority to enforce an agreement.

Nevertheless, Malino II was important in that it was a political statement that the conflict was considered officially concluded and that there was strong political will to reduce violence. As Malino II was a peace *agreement* and not a *declaration* like Malino I, it was seen by Malukans as a more meaningful document. The representatives who took part in the Malino II process understood that the conflict went beyond religious differences and appreciated that its dynamics were affected by the local government and military. While they insisted that both of these stakeholders sign the agreement as well, in the end only the Government did so.

In addition to the 11 terms of the agreement, Malino II established two joint commissions: one to monitor law and order; the other to oversee social and economic conditions. However, these were

poorly implemented and worked less well than equivalent commissions in Poso. The terms of the agreement were not widely disseminated outside Ambon city. The agreement was also not fully implemented: issues such as the return of IDPs and land disputes between different religious groups remain significant sources of tension. However, after the signing of the peace agreement, any acts of violence that were committed were treated as crimes and subject to the legal process – a shift away from the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of attacks pre-Malino II.

Violent protests and outbreaks of violence occurred sporadically after Malino II was signed, but the number declined after the Soya incident. Although the conflict is officially regarded as over, and few violent incidents have taken place since 2003, peace remains fragile as the root causes of the conflict were not addressed and new grievances have emerged. The domination of Muslims in business and Christians in education is a serious challenge. Malino II calls for a balance between the two groups but this has not yet been achieved.

The recovery and development phase

The Malino II peace agreement marked a turning point in the Government's conflict management approach. Both the local and central government took the peace agreement to mark the beginning of the conflict recovery phase. NGOs and civil society also shifted from the provision of emergency aid to peacebuilding activities.

Government initiatives Post-Malino II

Immediately after Malino II was signed, local and central government became more serious about working towards peace. Local government authorities throughout Maluku adopted the agreement as a guideline for their work. However, over time, cynicism grew because of the local government's poor implementation of the agreement. One of the most common complaints from local communities was that the findings of the National Investigation Team, which was tasked with investigating the causes of conflict and major violent incidents, remain unpublished: "*Why can they not publish the results? Whatever the result all Maluku people need to know the truth. Without the truth, we cannot go*

forward."⁵⁴ In addition, the *pokja* (working groups) set up under the Malino II Agreement to follow through with the implementation of the peace terms were not empowered by the authorities and lacked sufficient budgets. Many locals also considered the agreement elitist and lacking consultation with those at the grassroots.

Presidential Instruction No. 6 (*Inpres*) was a major conflict recovery initiative by the central government. It was signed by President Megawati Soekarnoputri on 21 September, 2003 and aimed to frame rehabilitation and reconstruction in Maluku and North Maluku. On 14 September 2004, the national parliament agreed that Rp. 1,210 trillion (USD 130.6 million) would be allocated in 2005 for the implementation of *Inpres* 6 in Maluku and North Maluku. An additional Rp. 250 billion (USD 26.9 million) would be allocated to both provinces for IDP-related activities in 2005.⁵⁵ The funds were mainly used for the development of infrastructure. However, the implementation of *Inpres* 6 in Maluku was plagued with problems due to a lack of accountability and transparency in the use of the funds.

There was also significant confusion about why *Inpres* 6 funds were sent to the provincial government when in the context of decentralisation law no. 32/2004 they should have been disbursed by the district government. Resentment from district and municipality officers grew. There was little co-ordination between the provincial government and district and municipality governments in the implementation of *Inpres* 6, without which recovery activities could not be implemented effectively. The extent of the provincial government's engagement was to request data on IDPs from the district government. This poor co-ordination had consequences: for example, in the Ambon suburb of Kayu Tiga, where IDPs were relocated, one school was built by the city authorities and another by the provincial government, even though only one was required.⁵⁶

The lack of clear directives and transparency regarding the distribution of the budget for *Inpres* 6, as well as poor accountability and monitoring of the use of the funds, allowed officials to engage in

54 Comment made in a workshop by the Director of Koalisi Pengungsi Maluku (Coalition of Maluku Refugees), Ambon City, 14 October 2009.

55 Brown, Graham et al (2005), p.53.

56 Interview by Akiko Horiba with staff of BAPPEDA (*Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah*/Regional Planning and Development Board), Ambon, 3 September 2009.



Thousands of migrants and refugees board a passenger ship taking them away from riot torn Ambon, February 28, 1999.
© AP Photo/Achmad Ibrahim

corruption. As one member of the regional parliament put it:

“There was corruption. Almost all the funds for peacebuilding were used for the reconstruction of infrastructure. It is easy for corruption to be committed between civil servant and contractors because there are no monitoring systems. Especially during the conflict period, nobody could check on how money for reconstruction was spent. The evidence? You can see the poor infrastructure in Maluku. A lot of money for peacebuilding came to Maluku but we do not know where it disappeared to.”⁵⁷

⁵⁷ Interview by Akiko Horiba with a member of the Malukan regional parliament (DPRD), Ambon City, 20 November 2009.

Internally displaced persons

From 1999 the Maluku Government had a *pokja* to manage IDPs. This worked in co-ordination with the national body for IDP management, the National Coordinating Body for Disaster and Internally Displaced Persons Management (BAKORNAS PBP). However, there were significant problems in delivering aid to IDPs. By the end of 2002, only 10,000 of an estimated 64,000 families received aid.⁵⁸ This was due both to the lack of reliable data and information on IDPs, and corruption in the management of funds. Local government had initially derived the figures for IDPs using the number of abandoned houses but this was later changed to the number of

⁵⁸ According to figures from the Norwegian Refugee Council, see: Brown, Graham et al (2005), p.55.

family heads, and later changed back to the number of houses abandoned. Using the number of houses as a guide was problematic when there were up to three families living in one house and fluctuating numbers of people within each family. These changes profoundly affected the distribution of health care, food and the reconstruction of houses.

After *Inpres 6* came into effect in 2004, the Government started to implement more serious measures to assist IDPs. However, the problems of corruption and unreliable data remained. In addition, the approach taken to rebuilding communities focused on physical buildings and reconstruction – little attention was given to repairing relations and building trust between IDPs and their surrounding communities. One provincial civil servant underlined the problem that “*some IDPs do not want to go back to their own village because of the trauma and fear from the experience of neighbours attacking them. Or IDPs want to return to their village but surrounding villages do not accept their return.*”⁵⁹

The return of IDPs in the aftermath of a communal conflict is complex, particularly so in Maluku where many of the IDPs were transmigrants from Bugis, Buton and Makassar. These migrants were living in Ambon before they fled the violence. They lost their property during the conflict, but could not easily produce registration documents or other evidence to prove that they were living in Ambon. The difficulty in verifying who was actually living in Ambon before the conflict was exploited by some who came to Ambon pretending to be IDPs so that they could claim the financial compensation offered by the Government. Such problems highlight the need for reliable data on IDPs to be maintained by village administrations and by communities themselves at the *Rukun Warga* or *Rukun Tetangga* level.⁶⁰

Pemekaran

In Indonesia, *pemekaran* refers to the division and creation of provinces, districts and sub-districts into smaller units. Indonesia’s 1999 local autonomy law permitted the division of provinces, districts

and sub-districts into smaller units for the purpose of better administration, more equitable resource distribution and a more representative government. In 1999, a new province, the North Maluku Province was created from the Maluku Province and created new districts, Maluku West Southeast (Maluku Tenggara Barat) and Buru. This was followed by the creation of West Seram (Seram Bagian Barat), East Seram (Seram Bagian Timur) and Aru in 2003, Tual city in 2007, and West Daya Maluku (Maluku Barat Daya) and South Buru (Buru Selatan) in 2008. There are now nine districts and two municipalities in Maluku.

These changes have been important in determining whether tensions are resolved violently or through other means. An unanticipated consequence of *pemekaran* is that there are now more opportunities for local elites to hold political office. Some of those who had been involved in instigating violence now see the opportunity to pursue their objectives through political channels. Hence *pemekaran* has increased political competition but helped to decrease violent conflict in Maluku.

The security forces

One of the biggest successes of Malino II was that it initiated a much more proactive response by the security forces, which in turn helped to reduce violence. Before the agreement, few were arrested or brought to trial for the crimes they committed. Although Malino II did not lead to widespread arrests of those who had planned violence, several key figures on both sides were brought to trial. In 2003, Alex Manuputti, leader of FKM and Ja’far Umar Talib, leader of Laskar Jihad, were arrested. Several suspected members of local terrorist groups or militias were arrested between 2004 and 2005 and brought to trial. While there was some public criticism over the failure to arrest other figures who had been involved in the violence, the decision to clamp down on the militias brought a certain degree of stability to Maluku.

Civil society

Civil society – including religious groups, international and local NGOs, academics, journalists, and women’s groups – worked mainly to distribute emergency aid prior to the Malino II peace talks. Only a handful were involved in reconciliation initiatives, such as the activities of the Interfaith

59 Interview by Akiko Horiba with the former Second Assistant in Maluku province, Ambon City, 2 September 2009.

60 These are the lowest strata of the government that runs the people’s daily social lives. Their task is to maintain harmonious relations between neighbors.

Institute which encouraged interfaith dialogue and promoted interaction between Christian and Muslims. Following the peace agreement, the local government prioritised reconstruction and the development of infrastructure but little attention was given to restoring social cohesion between religious groups. Civil society played a key role in filling in that gap, as well as working towards empowering women and providing for the needs of children.

In Ambon, there were roughly ten local NGOs before the conflict. By 2001, this number had increased to more than 600.⁶¹ The conflict brought in international NGOs and allowed local NGOs easy access to donor funds, even though some of the local NGOs possessed little to no local experience and had limited systems of transparency and accountability. When the emergency phase ended and the focus shifted to development, local NGOs started to dwindle: many did not have the experience and ability to manage reconciliation and development programs. Today there are around thirty NGOs, only ten of which are active.

Many donors and international NGOs also left Ambon following the tsunami in Aceh in 2004 and the earthquake in Yogyakarta 2005, making it difficult for local NGOs in Ambon to access funds for post-violence recovery.

After Malino II, international NGOs were more active in reconciliation activities, especially with IDPs. However, their success was limited by the fact that international organisations worked through local NGOs, who themselves had limited experience with “reconciliation”. Many donors and international NGOs also left Ambon following the tsunami in Aceh in 2004 and the earthquake in Yogyakarta 2005, making it difficult for local NGOs in Ambon to access funds for post-violence recovery. Members of local NGOs who were able to speak English left Ambon as well and headed to Aceh where opportunities were abundant. Local NGOs that have survived in Ambon have shifted their focus to alternative education, women’s and children’s empowerment, community development and revitalisation of traditions (*adat*).

61 Interview by Akiko Horiba with a former director of Hoalopu, Ambon City, 14 July 2009.

Revitalisation of adat

Adat refers to the customary laws, the unwritten traditional code regulating social, political and economic activity as well as the resolution of disputes. *Adat* has influenced specific ethnic group’s cultural norms, values and practices. The use of *adat* practices has declined sharply since the passage of Law No.5 in 1979 that introduced village administration which formalised control in the local government rather than among traditional leaders. This had a particularly significant impact in central Maluku, where there is a strong traditional inter-village alliance system that gradually declined after 1979. The alliance system had been an important mechanism for dispute resolution.

Attention to *adat* especially *panas pela* (revitalising traditional relations, *pela*) started before Malino II and was initiated by village leaders and some activists. Activities to revitalise *adat* helped to restore the Ambon identity and a sense of brotherhood among the Ambonese. Traditional leaders called *Raja* (king) played key roles in the community. Traditionally, *pela* alliance was a form of kinship established between two communities of different religions. However, in this context, *pela* was used to restore trust and re-establish communications between returning IDPs and their neighbouring villages.

The use of *adat* was effective because most people in Maluku are of the same ethnic group (Ambonese), unlike in Poso. Though *adat* had limited impact before Malino II, it subsequently became a symbol of reconciliation in Ambon and a means to restore a sense of community and identity among the Ambonese. In addition to *panas pela*, a *Raja*’s forum was created among traditional leaders. With the initial support of the Baku Bae movement, *Rajas* started discussing the relevance of their roles in the current context and in 2007 formed *Majelis Latupati Maluku* (MLM, Maluku traditional leaders’ conference). The formation of the MLM was seen as a revitalisation of *adat* and the recognition that the *Raja* still play an important role in the society. The *Rajas* were particularly useful in helping to mediate and resolve conflict between the different traditional communities (*masyarakat adat*) where their influence is still highly regarded. However, it is important to be aware of the limits of *adat*. Immigrants, especially from Bugis, Buton, Makassar and Java were often poorly integrated into traditional structures and *adat*.

Conclusion

Despite the numerous peace efforts, there was not a clear conflict management strategy and little co-ordination amongst the numerous actors in Maluku. This was especially the case during the emergency phase, when neither the central Government nor civil society had any long-term planning or future vision and conflict management was reactive. Security forces acted to prevent violence while local government and civil society focused on distributing the humanitarian aid. The lack of co-ordination and exchanging of information among the different stakeholders was seen as the biggest problem. However, several local communities adopted an effective conflict management strategy, as demonstrated by the example of the Wayame village and the *Baku Bae* movement.

It was only after the signing of the Malino II Peace Agreement that the central and local government seriously addressed the issues associated with the conflict. The Government's priority was reconstruction of infrastructure as well as resettlement

of IDPs. However, the lack of a system of accountability and transparency meant that funds for conflict recovery were often misused. In addition, the Government was seen as paying insufficient attention to social cohesion as well as dealing with the trauma experienced by victims of the conflict, and most of these tasks were taken on by civil society and NGOs. Many local NGOs themselves suffered when they used funds for emergency aid without concrete planning of what was *and* is needed by the local community. The revitalisation of Maluku *adat*, led by civil society, was one of the more effective conflict management strategies.

Although overt violence has declined, problems persist. In Ambon, for example, there are problems of segregation, unemployment, land and property disputes, increased migration from Java and religiously divided NGOs. Despite the power they have, through the decentralisation law, to create their own regulations (*peraturan daera, perda*), local government has not succeeded in offering clear policies to deal with these structural problems.

Case Study Two

Jakarta – Papua: A dialogue in the making

Introduction

Papuans have demanded separation from Indonesia since the 1960's, motivated by a range of historic, economic and political grievances.⁶² Serious efforts by the Government of Indonesia (GoI) to manage problems more effectively started in 1999, with the designation of the province as a special autonomous region. This was expected to reduce the disparity between Papua and other provinces. In reality, although the special autonomy law (*Otonomi Khusus bagi Provinsi Papua*, or OTSUS) accommodates some of the aspirations of many Papuan people and offers a possible framework for stability, in the nearly ten years since its adoption it has not significantly improved governance and development, thus Papuans are disillusioned with it.⁶³

This case study examines whether dialogue is a viable alternative approach to help resolve the conflict. It highlights *The Papua Road Map (Road Map)*, a proposal drafted by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, a state-run research body, which puts forward a model to achieve a comprehensive resolution to the conflict. In parallel, it elaborates on an initiative by the Papuan Catholic priest, Father Neles Tebay that promotes dialogue between the

Papuan community and the central government in Jakarta.

Both initiatives are home grown and build on an August 2005 statement made by the Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), that the government wants to resolve the conflict peacefully, placing significant emphasis on the use of dialogue. As a result of these two initiatives, dialogue has become part of the public discourse about how to manage the Papuan conflict and is accepted among many stakeholders on both sides as the key to preventing further conflict.

The case study concludes by arguing that the time is ripe for dialogue. Recommendations are given suggesting a number of concrete steps contributing to the preparation phase for dialogue as well as the actual dialogue.

The roots of Papua's contested political status lie largely in the process of Indonesia's decolonisation. When Indonesia became independent, the Dutch initially retained control over what was then Dutch New Guinea. The Netherlands set up a plan that would prepare Papua for independence by 1970. The first step towards self-rule was the inauguration of the New Guinea Council in April 1961.⁶⁴ On December 1, 1961 members of the New Guinea Council raised the Morning Star Flag (*Bintang Kejora*) and issued a manifesto about an independent state of West Papua.⁶⁵

The GoI reacted almost immediately. In December 1961, President Sukarno announced his "Triple

62 The use of the terms "Papuans" in this report refers to indigenous Papuans according to the special autonomy law No 21/ 2001 (OTSUS), namely "people originally of Melanesian race". The terms "indigenous" and "non indigenous" are defined by the political context. Officially, when the status of being "Papuan" is in dispute, a decision is made by the Papuan People's Council (MRP).

63 OTSUS was adopted by the Indonesian parliament on October 22, 2001. It entered into effect on December 22, 2001.

64 The Council was a Papuan representative body formed in the Dutch colony of Netherlands New Guinea in 1961; also known as the Nieu Guinea Raad.

65 For more on this pivotal event see: Saltford, John, *The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962–1969*, (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003).

Figure 1: Map of Papua



Courtesy of the Coordination Agency National Survey and Mapping (*Bakosurtanal*) and the Central Statistic Bureau (*Badan Pusat Statistik*), Republic of Indonesia, 2011.

People's Command (*Trikora*)" to "liberate" Papuans and to thwart the establishment of a "State of Papua".⁶⁶ Papua was to be integrated in the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.

The Indonesian National Army (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia* or TNI) soon realised that Papuans did not want to be "liberated". Although in some regions, such as Kaimana and Fakfak, Papuans supported the integration of Papua into Indonesia, in most regions they faced resistance from the Papuan Volunteer Corps (PVC), an armed unit set up in 1961 to defend Papua against the TNI.⁶⁷

In the context of the Cold War and the fear of Indonesia joining the communist block, the United States lobbied other Western governments to stop supporting the Dutch policy on Papua. The Dutch

finally agreed to a political solution, partly because the TNI dropped 1500 paratroopers into Papua to set an example of Indonesia's military strength.⁶⁸

In 1962 the Dutch and Indonesian Governments concluded the New York Agreement, which required the Dutch to leave Papua and transfer sovereignty to the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) for a period of six years until a vote could be conducted to determine Papuans' preference for either independence, or integration with Indonesia. Not having been a party to the New York Agreement negotiations, many Papuans were displeased and immediately stepped up efforts to reach independence. One manifestation of this desire was the emergence of the Papua Freedom Organisation (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka* or OPM) in 1965.⁶⁹ Primarily engaging in low-level

66 The *Trikora* stated: Defeat the formation of the puppet state of Papua of Dutch colonial make; Unfurl the Honoured Red and White Flag in Papua, Indonesian native land; Be ready for general mobilisation to defend the independence and unity of Country and Nation.

67 The Papuan Volunteer Corps (sometimes also called Papuan Volunteer Defence Forces) was dissolved in 1963 when UNTEA left Papua. Many of its members joined the OPM when it was founded in 1965. See: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unsbackgr.html.

68 Elmslie, Jim, *Irian Jaya under the gun: Indonesian economic development versus West Papuan nationalism*, (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002), p.19.

69 Some say that the OPM was founded in 1964. For example: Tan, Andrew (Ed.) 2, *A handbook of terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia*, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007).



'SOS, Indigenous Papuans in Danger'. © Muridan Widjojo

guerrilla operations, the OPM became the main conduit for armed resistance.⁷⁰

Almost immediately in 1963, Indonesia took over administration from UNTEA. Invoking the New York Agreement, 1026 Papuan representatives were selected to participate in the "Act of Free Choice" in 1969. The choice was to vote on becoming an independent state or joining Indonesia. The Indonesian state argued that the difficult geography of Papua and the Indonesian political culture of forging consensus by mutual deliberation (*musyawarah*) justified a vote by representatives rather than a popular referendum. Papuans were also considered "too simple" and "too primitive" to vote.⁷¹

70 Budiardjo, Carmel and Liong, Liem Soei, *West Papua: The Obliteration of a People*, (Surrey, UK: Tapol, 1984); Widjojo, Muridan, "Nationalist and Separatist Discourses in Cyclical Violence in Papua Indonesia", *Asian Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 34, No.3 (2006); International Crisis Group, "Radicalization and Dialogue in Papua", *Asia Report No 188*, 11 March (Brussels: ICG, 2010a).

71 Budiardjo and Liem (1984), p.30.

The result of the vote is enshrined in United Nations (UN) Resolution 2504, which endorses the transfer of sovereignty of Papua to Indonesia.⁷² Despite testimonials from the press on various and serious violations of the New York Agreement, and the opposition of 15 countries, Papua was handed over to Indonesia in November 1969 and officially incorporated into the Indonesian state in 1973. This history continues to fuel a sense of betrayal amongst Papuans, who believe that external actors – namely the US, the Netherlands and the UN – have a moral obligation to support the resolution of the Papuan conflict:

"The US, the Netherlands and the UN are part of the problem. They should act as mediator or

72 UN Resolution 2504, *Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning West New Guinea*, 20 November 1996. Available at: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRo/256/38/IMG/NRo25638.pdf?OpenElement>, accessed 10 June 2010.

at least be involved in the dialogue. They know our history because they are responsible for the conflict.”⁷³

After formally integrating Papua into Indonesia, President Soeharto took a number of steps which continue to mark the conflict today. Western New Guinea was renamed “Irian Jaya”, after he declared a military operation zone (*Daerah Operasi Militer* or DOM). The New Guinea Council was also disbanded and the Morning Star Flag and singing of the Papuan anthem forbidden.⁷⁴ The government then initiated co-operation with the US-based mining company Freeport McMoRan to mine the world’s largest deposit of copper near Timika.⁷⁵ The site has become a focus of protests against the exploitation of Papua’s vast natural resources. Soeharto also started the transmigration program under which settlers from Java and other densely populated regions moved to Papua, creating changes in Papuan communities that are a source of tension.⁷⁶ The combination of this policy and spontaneous economic migration has generated fears among Papuans that they will be marginalised. It is estimated that in 2011 non-Papuans will constitute 53.5 per cent of Papua’s population.⁷⁷

Conflict management initiatives for Papua

After Soeharto’s fall from power in May 1998 and the beginning of the *Reformasi* era, a number of initiatives to genuinely tackle the conflict in Papua were attempted. Most suffered from a refusal to accept the problems in Papua as inherently political. However promising new initiatives have emerged in recent years in Papua, as well as in Jakarta. Some of these include:

73 Statement of a Papuan during a closed-door discussion in Wamena, January 2010.

74 The council was a gathering of Papuan representatives from religious organizations, tribal leaders and elders to serve as a clearing-house for Papuan concerns, grievances, and proposals. It was perceived as the legitimate representation of the Papuan people. The Morning Star is the flag of Papua and is regarded as a symbol of opposition to Indonesian rule.

75 Papua is home to a vast array of natural resources, including rich gold, silver and copper deposits, as well as oil, gas, marine resources and timber. The town of Timika is a small mining town.

76 Under the transmigration program, ethnic groups such as Javanese and Buginese were provided with money to move to Papua. For more information see: McGibbon, Rodd, *Plural Society in Peril: Migration, Economic Change, and the Papua Conflict*, Policy Studies 13, (Washington: East-West Center, 2004a).

77 Widjojo, Muridan, (Ed.), (2009), p.17.

Forum for the Reconciliation of the Papua Society and the Team 100

In July 1998 church leaders, intellectuals and NGOs established the Forum for the Reconciliation of the Papua Society. In February 1999, this led to a “National Dialogue” between 100 Papuan leaders (Team 100) and President Habibie.⁷⁸ The process leading to this dialogue involved the preparation of Terms of Reference which were negotiated by Papuans and government officials. Compromises on the agenda were made and both sides agreed not to include independence and autonomy on the agenda and start with less sensitive issues. However, when Team 100 explicitly demanded independence for Papua, the government abruptly called off the dialogue and ended all conciliatory gestures.⁷⁹ Seven months later the Habibie administration enacted law 45/1999 establishing the provinces of Central and West Papua and partitioning a number of regencies, which Papuans interpreted as an attempt to divide and weaken them.

Papua People’s Congress

In 1999, in a new spirit of pluralism, President Abdulrahman Wahid publicly announced that the Indonesian government should accept part of the blame for Papua’s difficulties, and that reforms would be instituted promptly. However, Wahid also made it clear that he did not favour outright independence for Papua. In the months following Wahid’s accession to the Presidency, preparations were made for a Papuan People’s Congress, which would serve as a clearing-house for Papuan concerns, grievances and a platform for making proposals to Jakarta. For Papuans this offered a great opportunity to organise themselves and give voice to their aspirations.

During what is known as the ‘Great Consultation of Papuan Tribal Leaders’ (*Mubes or Musyawarah Besar*), the Papuan Presidium Council (PDP) was formed. The body’s goal was to advance independence. It was led by Theys Eluay and included political

78 The Forum for Reconciliation of the Papua Society (*Forum Rekonsiliasi Rakyat Irian* or FORERI) was established by the leadership of churches, traditional councils, student groups, women’s groups, and Papuan NGOs in 1998. It has sought to serve as an independent and non-aligned body mediating the dialogue between the national government and Papuan representatives, but also reconciliation between Papuan communities. It has never been formally dissolved but does not play a role anymore.

79 Alua, Agus, *Dialog Nasional Papua dan Indonesia 26 Februari 1999*, (Jayapura: STFT Fajar Timur, 2002a).

and religious leaders as well as academics and others representing the aspirations of ethnic Papuans. It was seen as a legitimate representation of the Papuan people.⁸⁰ The PDP organised the second Papua Congress from May 29 to June 3 2000 and it was seen as the successor of the 1961 New Guinea Council. It was attended by several thousand participants from all over Papua.⁸¹ It established four commissions covering the rectification of history, the development of a political agenda, the consolidation of Papuan organisations, and indigenous rights.

The second Papua Congress also led Papuan leaders to call on the GoI to engage in a dialogue mediated by a neutral third party. The PDP submitted to the government its draft terms of reference for the proposed dialogue and members of the international community (such as the European Union) welcomed the call for dialogue while others offered themselves as mediators (such as New Zealand's then Foreign Minister Phil Goff). The GoI did not respond to such calls and offers.

In early June 2000, the [second Papua] Congress declared that Papua was an independent and sovereign nation. This was unacceptable to Jakarta.

In early June 2000, the Congress declared that Papua was an independent and sovereign nation. This was unacceptable to Jakarta.⁸² President Wahid, whose government had co-funded the Congress (with Freeport and British Petroleum), publicly declared that the Congress was illegitimate. The President considered organised threats to Indonesian sovereignty illegal and a crackdown by military and police units throughout Papua followed. Papuans attacked Javanese migrants, prompting

further harsh military measures. On November 10, 2001 the president of the PDP, Theys Eluay, was allegedly assassinated by the Indonesian Army's Special Forces (Kopassus).⁸³ The Papuan resistance was immediately weakened and soon after his murder the central government intensified military operations to try and eliminate the armed resistance.

Special Autonomy Law

On 21 November 2001 President Megawati Sukarnoputri signed Law 21/2001 on Special Autonomy in Papua. Many in Jakarta were convinced that, short of outright independence, the majority of the demands from Papuan resistance groups would be met under the law.⁸⁴ Although OTSUS did have limited positive effects, allowing Papuans to take a bigger part in Papuan political life⁸⁵ and guaranteeing an ever-growing flow of funds into the two provinces⁸⁶, a majority of Papuans and many observers in Jakarta feel that OTSUS has failed.

In the words of Barnabas Suebu, Governor of Papua province:

*"Papua is full of conflict and paradoxes. [...] OTSUS was a solution but it has become a problem."*⁸⁷

80 Many Papuans admire Theys Eluay as a great leader of the Papuan people. For Eluay the Papuan struggle was religious, comparable to that of the Israelites who were led by Moses out of the bondage of Egypt. Eluay and the other PDP leaders repeatedly stressed the importance of a non-violent approach. Those Papuans who may have wanted violence were accused of being traitors to the Papuan case, hired "provocateurs". During his leadership of the PDP he largely managed to unite different Papuan groups. Kopassus allegedly killed him in 2001. An overview about Theys Eluay's life can be found on Wikipedia. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theys_Eluay, accessed 7 July 2010.

81 Depending on the source, the number of participants ranges from 1,000 to several thousands.

82 *Resolution of the Second Papua's People Congress*, 4 June 2000. Available at: <http://freewestpapua.org/docs/congressII.htm>, accessed 23 July 2010.

83 A special national investigation was set up by President Megawati to investigate the killing and look for possible involvement of government departments or sections of the army. In the end four Kopassus soldiers were convicted and sentenced to between two and four years in jail. The US government had already cut off all aid to the Indonesian military in 1999 as a result of widespread human rights violations in East Timor and had refused to resume aid to Kopassus, in particular, because of ongoing concerns about its record and lack of accountability. However, in 2010 the Obama administration decided to lift the ban. See: Giay, Benny, *Pembunuhan Theys, Kematian HAM di Tanah Papua*, (Yogyakarta: Galangpress, 2006); East Timor Action Network, *Background on Kopassus and Brimob* (2008) available at: www.etan.org/news/2008/04brikop.htm, accessed 16 December 2010. Human Rights Watch, "Indonesia: US Resumes Military Assistance to Abusive Force", 22 July, 2010 available at: www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/07/22/indonesia-us-resumes-military-assistance-abusive-force, accessed 24 August 2010.

84 Braithwaite, John, Cookson, Michael, Braithwaite, Valerie, and Dunn, Leah, "Papua", in Braithwaite, John, Braithwaite, Valerie, Cookson, Michael, and Dunn, Leah, (Eds.), *Anomie and Violence. Non-truth and Reconciliation in Indonesian Peace Building*, (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2010), p.88.

85 The Governors of the two provinces are Papuans and all members of the MRP are indigenous Papuans. The upper tiers of the bureaucracy are mostly Papuan, as are most local NGOs.

86 In 2002, Papua received Rp. 1.3 trillion, 2.9 trillion in 2006, and 3.5 trillion in 2008 from the province's special allocation fund (DAK) to cover development investments with a special provision for health and education.

87 Comment during the book launch of the English version of *The Papua Road Map*, August 2010, Jakarta.

Box 1: OTSUS – Its origins and contents

The drafting of OTSUS began in 2000 with the initiative of the then Papua Governor, Jacob Solossa.⁸⁸ This draft was based on wide public consultation but was met with stiff resistance by the PDP, the Traditional Council (DAP) and students, who rejected the idea in favour of a direct dialogue with Jakarta.⁸⁹ Once submitted to the Indonesian national parliament (DPR), the law also faced opposition in Jakarta. The Home Affairs Ministry submitted its own draft to the DPR that lacked many of the substantial elements suggested by the Papuans, though it was blocked because of the intervention of high-ranking officials led by Agum Gumelar, then Coordinating Minister for Legal, Political and Security Affairs. A number of mechanisms, such as a Special Committee (*Pansus*), a Working Committee (*Panja*) and a Drafting Team (*Timus*) of the DPR (including a delegation from the local Papua government) further deliberated the draft law.⁹⁰ The law that was finally passed omitted some powers such as the right to hold a referendum but it nevertheless granted Papua a stronger form of autonomy than in Aceh.⁹¹

In theory, OTSUS grants the two Papuan provincial governments' authority in all areas of government except foreign affairs and external defence as well as fiscal and monetary policy. Its judiciary remains subject to the authority of the Supreme Court of Indonesia. OTSUS acknowledges the rights of Papuans and aims to improve both governance and devel-

opment, regulating the distribution of revenue between the Gol and Papua in important sectors.⁹²

The centrepiece of OTSUS was the establishment of the Papuan People's Council (*Majelis Rakyat Papua* or MRP).⁹³ It was supposed to comprise indigenous Papuans, men and women from traditional communities (*adat*) and religious institutions. The law granted the MRP wide-ranging powers such as review and veto authority over the selection of candidates for the governorship.⁹⁴ The MRP was meant to be established two years after OTSUS entered into force but Jakarta feared its potential power and so delayed writing a government regulation establishing the MRP for almost four years. This delay effectively stalled political and legal processes concerning the implementation of OTSUS, which needed to be passed by the MRP.

Compared to what was envisaged under OTSUS, the regulation that eventually established the MRP gave the body limited powers. It functions only as an apolitical cultural body with limited power and resources to protect indigenous Papuan interests.

In the ten years since OTSUS was enacted, the Gol has produced only two of the ten implementing regulations needed. Some of the government's legislation also highlights the central government's suspicion of genuine autonomy, for example by prohibiting the use of Papuan symbols such as the Morning Star flag and the Mambruk bird.⁹⁵ OTSUS allows the raising of the Papuan flag under certain conditions but government regulation 77/2007 prohibits the use of these symbols.

Although President Megawati signed OTSUS, she was not committed to its aims. She disagreed with President Wahid's more liberal stance on autonomy and negotiating agreements with separatists and believed that OTSUS would strengthen the separatist movement. As a result, she contravened OTSUS by dividing Papua into three provinces: Central Papua, Papua, and West Papua. While Papua and West Papua provinces were established, the creation of a separate central province was blocked by Indonesian courts, which declared it to be unconstitutional and in contravention of the special autonomy agreement.

When SBY and Vice President Jusuf Kalla came to power in October 2004, the expectation of Papuans for a comprehensive settlement to be achieved rose again, as President Yudhoyono indicated that:

88 Solossa was Governor from 2000 until his death in 2005.

89 McGibbon, Rodd, "Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution?" Policy Studies 10, (Washington: East-West Center, 2004b), p.33.

90 Musa'ad, Mohammad, *Papua Special Autonomy: Impact of General Election and Direct Local Head Elections*, (Place of publication and publisher unknown, 2009), p.131.

91 McGibbon, Rodd (2004b), p.20.

92 Chauvel, Richard and Ikrar, Bhakti Nusa, *The Papua Conflict: Jakarta's Perceptions and Policies*, Policy Studies 5, (Washington: East-West Center, 2004); Musa'ad, Mohammad (2009), p.135.

93 The authorities of the MRP according to the law are: To give consideration and approval to the candidate Governor and Deputy Governor proposed by the DPRP; To give consideration and approval to the candidate members of the People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia, regional representatives of the Papua Province proposed by the DPRP; To give consideration and approval to the Bill of Perdasus (special provincial legislation) submitted by the DPRP together with the Governor; To give suggestions, consideration and approval to the planned cooperation agreement drawn up by the Government as well as the Provincial Government with third parties applicable in the Papua Province, in particular related to the protection of the rights of the Papua natives; To observe and convey the aspiration, complaints of the adat community, the religious people, women and the public in general in relation with the rights of the Papua natives, and to facilitate the follow-up settlement; and To give consideration to the DPRP, Governor, Regency/City DPRP and the Regent/Mayor on matters related to the protection of the rights of the Papua natives. The authorities of the MRP can be found in: Government Regulation Number 54/2004 concerning the Papuan Community Parliament. Available at: www.papuaweb.org/goi/pp/2004-54-en.pdf, accessed 16 December 2010.

94 McGibbon, Rodd (2004b), p.21.

95 Presidential Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia (*perpres*) 77/2007. The Mambruk Bird (bird of peace) is the "Papua state seal".

Box 2: Assessing OTSUS

OTSUS was not forged out of dialogue with Papuans or the main conflict parties, and was not understood by all the stakeholders as a signal to end the conflict.⁹⁶ Papuans have little ownership in OTSUS and pro-Indonesia groups oppose the law, viewing it as excessively compromising to separatists.⁹⁷

At the provincial and district level, OTSUS has been used by Papuan politicians and bureaucrats to increase their power and gain access to funds. The majority of Papuans believe that the estimated Rp 28 trillion in funds made available to Papua under special autonomy have not reached them effectively. The former chairperson of the MRP, the late Agus Alua⁹⁸, summed up the prevailing view: “No one is really committed to implement OTSUS. When one official speaks of OTSUS, one actually only thinks of money, not policy.”⁹⁹

Allegations of misuse of state funds in Papua are common but such allegations are rarely followed up.¹⁰⁰ Anecdotal evidence suggests that the central government turns a blind eye to such corruption to reward Papuan elites for supporting the government’s national integration policies. Papuan politicians and bureaucrats therefore have little incentive to successfully implement OTSUS, which has, in turn, undermined public support for it.

OTSUS has not reduced violence in Papua. The security forces maintain an approach which often results in discrimination and human rights violations, while OPM has not seen OTSUS as a sufficient reason to abandon their armed struggle. OTSUS has failed to meet the aspirations of student groups such as Front Pepera and the West Papua National Committee (KNPB) who favour a secessionist agenda which in turn provokes further repression.

“The government wishes to solve the issue in Papua in a peaceful, just and dignified manner by emphasising dialogue and persuasion. The policy for the settlement of the issue in Papua is focused on consistent implementation

96 Widjojo, Muridan (Ed.), (2009), p. 152.

97 “A driving force in the Indonesian government’s backsliding, for instance, was the official concern that special autonomy was fuelling separatism rather than resolving it. In conceding special rights to Papua and Aceh, officials feared a cascade of similar demands from other regions.” (McGibbon, 2004, p. viii); See also Timmer, Jaap, “Papua”, *The Contemporary Pacific*, Volume 17, Number 2, (2005), pp.448-456.

98 Agus Alua died on 7 April 2011.

99 Interview with Agus Alua, Chairperson of the MRP, Jayapura, 8 June 2009.

100 Allegedly, public funds have been used to build a house for the DPRP leader and IDR 5bn remained unaccounted for. See Widjojo, Muridan (Ed.), (2009), p.29.

of special autonomy as a just, comprehensive and dignified solution.”¹⁰¹

Under the first Yudhoyono administration, important steps towards the implementation of OTSUS were achieved, notably the establishment of the MRP. Substantial decentralisation of power has occurred since 2004, with the GoI devolving most policy areas except for foreign affairs, defence and security, fiscal and monetary policy, religious affairs, and justice. However, as is often the case in Indonesia, the spirit of the law and its implementation regulations differ considerably.

To address these problems, SBY issued a “new deal policy for Papua” (*Inpres* No.5/2007), a presidential instruction aiming to accelerate development in Papua and West Papua.¹⁰² While this measure was welcomed at first, it eventually increased opposition to OTSUS because it allowed the central government to retake control of important budget decisions.¹⁰³

Papua ‘Land of Peace’

In December 2002, Tom Beanal, then deputy chair of the PDP, declared Papua a ‘Zone of Peace’: “a territory free from violence, oppression and grief”. The TNI did not agree with this wording, which in turn prompted church leaders to declare Papua to be a ‘Land of Peace’, a concept and wording agreeable to all actors in Papua.¹⁰⁴ In November 2004, the churches issued a joint appeal condemning injustice and oppression, emphasising the necessity of dialogue as the way to solve problems, and demanding that the GoI address unresolved allegations of human rights violations. This campaign under the umbrella of the ‘Land of Peace’ concept was embraced by a wide range of religious leaders and it’s supported

101 Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, *State Address of the President of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government Statement on the Bill on the State Budget for the 2006 Fiscal Year and its Financial Note before the Plenary Session of the House of Representatives*, 16 August, 2005.

102 *Inpres* no.5/2007 provides for the establishment of an assistance team, chaired by the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, responsible for co-ordinating and synchronizing sector programs and policies necessary to support the development acceleration program in the provinces. It indicates five priority areas for the provinces’ development including the improvement of basic infrastructure required to provide better access to services for the communities living in remote and rural areas as well as the ones close to the national border. It also specially indicates the need for special efforts to accelerate the provinces’ development through new transportation infrastructure programmes.

103 Braithwaite, John et al., (2010), p.92.

104 More information can be found under: www.faithbasednetworkonwestpapua.org/.

by most actors including the OPM and the security services. In 2007, the TNI started an informal exchange with local human rights NGOs on how to translate the concept into reality.¹⁰⁵ At the end of 2007 religious leaders again declared that conflicts should be settled peacefully through a joint conflict resolution process involving the government and the Papuans, facilitated by a neutral third party. A comprehensive evaluation backed by the government and Papuans on the implementation of the autonomy law was suggested, as was prioritising the proper implementation of the autonomy law over creating new provinces or regencies in Papua.

LIPI Road Map

More recently LIPI, a governmental research body tasked with advising the government on policy matters, produced a detailed proposal – *The Papua Road Map* – for an inclusive dialogue process led by the government and possibly facilitated by an impartial third party.¹⁰⁶

The *Road Map* identifies four root causes of the conflict:

- The marginalisation of indigenous Papuans, particularly economically, taking into account the effects of transmigration;
- The failure of development programmes in Papua to prevent economic marginalisation;
- Fundamentally diverging understanding of history between Jakarta and Papua;
- A legacy of state-sponsored violence against Papua.¹⁰⁷

LIPI suggests a “New Papua” approach through affirmative policies that empower Papuans. LIPI

¹⁰⁵ Braithwaite, John et al., (2010), p.94.

¹⁰⁶ Widjojo, Muridan (Ed.), (2009). The Indonesian version of the book was launched on 30 June 2009 by the Minister of Defence Juwono Sudarsono. In 2010 the book was published in English jointly by LIPI, Yayasan Obor Indonesia, KITLV Jakarta-Leiden and ISEAS Singapore. Its executive summary was circulated on the internet in Bahasa Indonesia and English a year before its publication and has attracted positive international, national and local responses.

¹⁰⁷ This violence resulted from a long-standing military-security approach to governing Papua motivated by fears of a separatist attempt to break away. This approach has been backed by the nationalists in Jakarta that dominate both the civilian and military bureaucracy, and has continued through Indonesia’s transition to democracy. There have been persistent allegations of violence against alleged separatist leaders, for example: The 2009 killing of Papuan guerrilla leader Kelly Kwalik by Densus 88 has revived and reinforced resentment towards Jakarta, especially among young Papuans from the highlands.

recommends dialogue as a means for building a shared understanding about the roots of the problems. It distinguishes between four levels of dialogue: national dialogue between the GoI and Papuans, dialogue among Papuans in Papua, informal dialogue among the Papuan elites, and international dialogue between representatives of the GoI and Papua with an international mediator.

In LIPI’s model, a pre-dialogue stage is needed to build support for a dialogue in the first place and establish terms of reference (ToRs). An internal dialogue follows to socialise these ToRs and revise and finalise them. In terms of an agenda, LIPI suggests broaching the issues of history and the political status of Papua, reconciliation and human rights, the failure of development, and marginalization and discrimination.

Its weakness may be that it is, at times, too academic. It focuses on policies of local authorities, neglecting analysis of the GoI’s policies. Little light is shed on economic issues or the role of extractive industries and the TNI. The issue of religious tensions between Muslims and Christians, induced mainly by the arrival of migrants from other parts of Indonesia, is not given enough attention.

Noting these criticisms, the *Road Map* is a well considered and timely document. As LIPI is a state institution, it can more easily encourage other actors across the GoI to engage seriously with the idea of dialogue than would be the case if it had been a civil society initiative. To date, it has produced a crucial initial impetus to build support for dialogue in Jakarta and in Papua.

The Tebay Blueprint for Dialogue

In 2009, a Papuan Catholic priest and leading civil society figure, Father Neles Tebay, launched an initiative in Papua to promote dialogue between the Papuan community and the Government in Jakarta. He underlines the need for dialogue, stressing that violence will not solve the conflict, special autonomy has failed and the government is losing the support of both Papuans and the international community. He holds that both parties must demonstrate willingness for dialogue and re-establish trust.

Tebay suggests holding the dialogue under the ‘Land of Peace’ umbrella. He explains that, before dialogue is possible, internal dialogue among indigenous Papuans, between indigenous and non-indigenous Papuans, and between Papuans in Papua and those in exile, must take place. He argues that



'Otsus is already dead, 2005'. © Muridan S. Widjojo

a third party is not intended to internationalise the conflict but only to help parties build the trust necessary to find a peaceful solution.¹⁰⁸

Tebay's blueprint is refreshing as it acknowledges the difficulties in both Jakarta and Papua, boldly suggesting a framework which can lead both conflict parties away from their maximalist positions. It has become a widely read document in Papua and the basis for discussions about a potential dialogue process with the central government.

Resolving the Papua Conflict

Recent changes in political dynamics – growing support for dialogue

It is not surprising, given the asymmetry in power between the parties to the conflict, the GoI has been more reluctant than Papuan leaders to engage in a dialogue.

One of the main outcomes of the Papua People Congress in 2000 was an agreement that it would seek to achieve its goals through dialogue. Subsequently, this view has gained support both among Papuans living in Papua and the diaspora, even if there are divergent expectations of what a dialogue can deliver, particularly regarding independence. Public consultations led by civil society representatives (described later in the section *Preparing the Ground for Dialogue*) have been instrumental in building a consensus among Papuans regarding dialogue. These consultations led two of the main political umbrella groups, the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCL) and the West Papua National Authority (WPNA) to form a collective leadership and publicly express support for dialogue. This has been echoed by three groups of the National Liberation Army (TPN) and exiled Papuan leaders. Both urban-based political groups and insurgents in the highlands and in the jungle have essentially agreed to stop pursuing their goals through violent means, and pursue a peaceful settlement with the GoI.

¹⁰⁸ Tebay, Neles, *Dialog Jakarta-Papua, Sebuah Perspektif Papua* (Jayapura: Office for Justice and Peace, 2009).

A major obstacle to dialogue has always been Jakarta's contention that Papuan society is too fragmented and so it is hard to identify Papuan representatives. This is a reasonable concern given that, since the death of Theys Eluay, there is no single, recognised Papuan leader either in Papua or in exile. However, this problem is increasingly being addressed through the civil society public consultation process. Groups brought together from across the political spectrum have recognised the need for unification and, despite differences in approach, about 90 per cent of those who participated in the consultations expressed support for dialogue.

Over the past year, the notion of a dialogue between Jakarta and Papua has gained traction. In June 2010, the MRP made 11 recommendations, the two most important of which were to hand back the Special Autonomy Law to Jakarta and to urge Jakarta to hold a dialogue with indigenous Papuans.¹⁰⁹ The prominent Papuan Catholic priest, Neles Tebay considered the MRP's actions and stated:

“Although the special autonomy policy implemented since 2001 was hailed by many as the only viable solution, it was not the result of genuine dialogue between the Indonesian government and the Papuans. This evident lack of ownership is one important element to understand better why the government never implemented the autonomy consistently and comprehensively, and why the Papuans can easily hand the law back to the government. What Papuans want instead is first and foremost to be taken seriously and to have their grievances acknowledged. The mention of referendum and recognition of Papuans’ sovereignty is to be understood as underlining the necessity of dialogue.”¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ The other MRP recommendations were: the holding of a referendum directed towards political independence; the GoI recognizes the restoration of the sovereignty of the People of West Papua which was proclaimed on 1st December 1961; urging the international community to impose an embargo on international aid being provided for the implementation of the Special Autonomy Law; no need for revisions to be made to Law 21/2001 on Special Autonomy; halting all proceedings for the election of heads of district in Papua, ending transmigration and imposing strict supervision on the flow of migration to Papua; urging releasing all Papuan political prisoners being held in prisons everywhere in Indonesia; demilitarize Papua; closing Freeport Indonesia. The recommendations are available at: www.etan.org/issues/wpapua/2010/1007wpap.htm#Special_Autonom

¹¹⁰ Tebay, Neles, “Papuans want a Negotiated Solution”, *The Jakarta Globe*, 5 July, (2010).

Reactions from Jakarta were mixed. Some blamed Papuans for failing to implement OTSUS. Initially, the President decided to increase special autonomy and regional funds allocated to Papua, West Papua and Aceh for 2011, as well as begin an evaluation of OTSUS in Papua.¹¹¹

OTSUS failed, Inpres 5/07 had no impact, there is no law and order anymore in Papua, the security situation deteriorates, prosperity declines, the culture of violence gets a boost and marginalisation continues. Only through dialogue can the conflict be solved.

An encouraging development was the President's Independence Day speech on 17 August 2010 in which he expressed his wish to engage in “constructive communication” with Papua. As an initial step, the President sought to improve communications between the Government and the Parliament of the Papua Province (DPRP), Parliament of the West Papua Province (DPRD), and the MRP.

Critically, the President's statement has helped strengthen the position of progressives within government. In more conservative government circles even the term “dialogue” is sensitive, as it raises fears about the disintegration of Indonesia and is interpreted as bestowing both parties with equal standing. Their fear is that dialogue will lead to the contestation of the New York Agreement of 1962 and of the Act of Free Choice of 1969, questioning the very basis of Indonesian sovereignty in Papua, and that acknowledging human rights abuses committed by the government could tarnish Indonesia's image.

More progressive elements in the government include a number of senior officials in the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As General (ret.) Bambang Dharmono has noted:

“OTSUS failed, Inpres 5/07 had no impact, there is no law and order anymore in Papua, the security situation deteriorates, prosperity

¹¹¹ In addition to the evaluation of the GoI, the West Papua parliament has also announced an evaluation. This evaluation is a consequence of the MRP decision in June and shall enable the local government to define its policy towards the GoI.

declines, the culture of violence gets a boost and marginalisation continues. Only through dialogue can the conflict be solved.”¹¹²

Since the President’s speech, there have been a number of positive signs indicating some shift in policy towards Papua. On September 20 2010, the President formally gave Vice President Boediono the mandate to oversee Papua policy and push forward the implementation of special autonomy. A unit known as UP4B (*Unit Percepatan Pembangunan Papua dan Papua Barat / Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua*) is set to be established in 2011, and will work across five areas: infrastructure, politics, investment, social aspects and budgetary issues. There is a risk, however, that the unit will be perceived by Papuans as imposed by Jakarta without consultation – fears which have arisen because only the two Papuan Governors have been consulted about the new unit. The framing of the unit’s mandate is also important. Presenting it as the start of a process towards finding a solution to the conflict will garner greater acceptance than if it is sold as a development and infrastructure package to promote investment.

Though the international community has not developed a sustained interest in Papua, some recent actions have encouraged the GoI to focus its attention on Papua.

Though the international community has not developed a sustained interest in Papua, some recent actions have encouraged the GoI to focus its attention on Papua. In September 2010, the US Congress invited Papuan representatives to Washington for the first ever hearing on Papua.¹¹³ As a direct reaction, the Indonesian President dispatched his three coordinating ministers on an impromptu trip to Papua and the President himself visited Papua at the end of November 2010. President Obama seized the occasion to reference Papua in a

112 Bambang Dharmono is a retired Brigadier General. His last position before his retirement in fall 2010 was Secretary General of the National Resilience Council. This comment was made in August 2010 in Jakarta at the launch of the *Road Map*.

113 Testimony of Joe Yun, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2010/09/147551.htm, access date 16 September 2010.

public address during his November 2010 visit to Indonesia, providing further international attention.¹¹⁴

Despite growing momentum towards dialogue in both Jakarta and Papua, there are of course important disagreements over the modalities of any dialogue. While the GoI is clearly against any “internationalisation” of the conflict, almost all Papuans request that dialogue be held outside Indonesia. A middle ground, such as a dialogue within Indonesia monitored by international actors, needs to be found. There is also debate about the role of third party mediation. The Aceh agreement perhaps entrenched some in government against the role of third parties, while almost all Papuans involved in these consultations believe that dialogue will only succeed if a neutral third party is present. They are sceptical towards another “national dialogue”:

“A national dialogue will be used by the Government to demonstrate to the international community that they have solved the problem. But there will be no witnesses; the Government can manipulate the process.”¹¹⁵

Preparing the ground for dialogue

Preparations towards dialogue between Jakarta and Papua have started with LIPI and Father Neles Tebay pushing forward their proposals for dialogue and co-operating where appropriate. Their preparations are divided into four parallel steps:

Building a network of Papuan facilitators

“The starting point for any overtures toward dialogue will probably be [. . .] some informal activities of courageous, well-connected individuals on both sides, who at first, will be working in their private capacities.”¹¹⁶

114 In his public address at the University of Indonesia, President Obama said: “Because ultimately, it will be the rights of citizens that will stitch together this remarkable Nusantara that stretches from Sabang to Merauke – an insistence that every child born in this country should be treated equally, whether they come from Java or Aceh; Bali or Papua.” While clearly outlining Indonesia’s territory, he stressed the need to address discrimination as one of the root causes of conflict in Papua.

115 Statement made by a Papuan during the public consultation in Sorong, 22 February 2010.

116 Kivimaki, Timo, *Initiating a Peace Process in Papua: Actors, Issues, Process, and the Role of the International Community*, Policy Studies 25, (Washington: East-West Center, 2006), p.54.

The Papua Peace Network (PPN) was established in 2010 by Father Neles Tebay and LIPI to develop the capacity of ‘informal Papuan facilitators’ from across the religious, ethnic and political spectrum. This was done to support intra-Papuan consultation, and to help Papuans prepare for a potential dialogue process with the central government. The PPN is a group of about 30 Papuan and non-Papuan leaders representing different factions of the society (30 per cent are women). Other NGOs have become increasingly involved in the PPN, lending the initiative greater legitimacy.

The PPN has approached Papuan leaders, members of the DPRP and MRP about the prospect of dialogue and these important interlocutors have expressed their support. Just as importantly, potential spoilers within the pro-independence camp have been engaged so as to build broad support for dialogue. Some of the youth groups have openly suggested using violence to attack symbols of state repression such as police or military posts, and to refuse dialogue. The PPN has continuously approached and involved prominent student and youth leaders in its facilitating team to better promote understanding of the strengths and the weaknesses of dialogue as a means of resolving conflict.

Government engagement

Strong objections to dialogue and to the *Road Map* have come from different state institutions, particularly the State Intelligence Agency (*Badan Intelijen Negara* or *BIN*), Ministry of Home Affairs, and Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs. They believe that the *Road Map*, and dialogue in general, offer too much space for secessionism and would lead to the internationalisation of the conflict due to the suggested use of a foreign mediator. To try and build a consensus in favour of dialogue, networks of pro-dialogue individuals in influential positions were developed, slowly enlarging the constituency in favour of dialogue in strategically important government circles. In addition to the Vice President’s Office, the government’s advisory bodies such as the National Resilience Institute of the Republic of Indonesia (*Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional* or *Lemhanas*) and National Resilience Council (*Dewan Pertahanan Nasional* or *Wantanas*) have shown their support for a dialogue initiative. A number of Ministers as well as senior figures in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commission I of the National Parliament have

also shown their support.¹¹⁷ A parliamentarian, Hayono Isman, has recently observed:

“*Papua should be a priority of the government and I hope that the problem is solved when SBY’s presidency ends.*”¹¹⁸

Seeking grassroots legitimacy through public consultation

Support from the leaders of Papuan factions does not necessarily guarantee the support of the Papuan community. Papuan leadership is mostly vertically stratified, with constituencies confined to narrow tribal or religious communities. No single leader enjoys Papua-wide support.

To help leaders maintain support and legitimacy from grassroots communities, the PPN has supported a series of public consultations in different regencies and towns across Papua. These provide a forum for listening to the grievances of the communities, explaining dialogue, listening to the communities’ views and identifying criteria for the election of Papuan delegates in a potential dialogue with the Government. At each consultative forum, 50 individuals from a wide range of groups are invited including pro-independence factions, armed groups, local authorities, Merah Putih groups (Indonesian nationalists), local tribal leaders, religious figures, youth leaders and women leaders.

During the public consultations, Papuans have shown a great willingness to compromise. While more compromise will be necessary to find middle ground with Jakarta, the series of consultations demonstrate that Papua is a less fragmented society, eager and preparing for genuine dialogue.

Consultations with the Papuan diaspora

The Papuan diaspora consists of different groups in Vanuatu, Sweden, the Netherlands, the UK and the US. These groups are fragmented and often compete with each other. Engagement with the Papuan diaspora, however, is a critical aspect of developing support for, and a consensus within the Papuan community on, dialogue.

117 “Perlu, Dialog Papua” [Papua Dialogue is Needed], *Kompas Daily*, 19 January, (2010).

118 Isman is a member of Komisi I. He made this remark when he was on the panel of the book launch of the English version of *The Papua Road Map*, August 2010, Jakarta.

Consultations with diaspora groups have taken place. At an exiled Papuan leaders' summit in December 2010 in Papua New Guinea, the leaders signed a declaration agreeing on supporting Father Neles Tebay's blueprint for dialogue that shall result in a dialogue process with the GoI.¹¹⁹

Recommendations

The time is ripe for dialogue between the Papuan community and the central government in Jakarta, even if important obstacles remain. Although framed slightly differently, both Papuans and the Indonesian Government have expressed a willingness to talk. In Papua there is a clear trend towards the unification of disparate factions and increasing support for dialogue. The President's August 2010 speech marks the beginning of a policy shift in Jakarta. The recommendations below build on these tentative positive developments and suggest a number of concrete steps contributing to the preparation phase for, as well as the actual, dialogue:

Appointing a special envoy or team

One of the most important steps that could be taken by President Yudhoyono to advance dialogue would be to appoint an impartial special representative or team of representatives, consisting of individuals respected in Jakarta and acceptable to Papuans who are familiar with the conflict and dedicated to resolving it. The special representative, ideally reporting directly to the President, would initially function as a facilitator, tasked with designing and organising a peace dialogue team. This would involve helping both sides prepare their delegates for dialogue and continuously communicating and co-ordinating with PPN volunteers in Papua to ensure that the Papuan community is informed and can participate in the process. It will be important to ensure that delegates represent the range of different resistance groups, especially those advocating independence. Their involvement will determine the legitimacy of the peace talks in the eyes of ordinary Papuans. The special envoy should also establish a consultative mechanism for developing the terms of reference of a dialogue process, and indicate transparently both in Papua and Jakarta how the outcome or eventual agreement will be imple-

mented by all parties. This could be achieved through a series of workshops and seminars held in Papua and Jakarta – ideally in an academic setting – helping those opposed to dialogue to increase their understanding of the goals and parameters of dialogue.

Evaluate OTSUS

Establish an independent commission to inquire into the operation and funding of the Special Autonomy Law. While President Yudhoyono announced an evaluation of OTSUS in 2010, it has yet to be carried out. The commission could consist of experts (including, if not led by, Papuans) acceptable to most stakeholders to conduct an impartial evaluation of OTSUS. The main focus of the evaluation would need to be which articles have been implemented, by whom and how, as well as to identify reasons for the non-implementation of significant articles. Ideally, the evaluation would be done together with a thorough audit of how OTSUS resources have been spent. The findings of such a commission would contribute to providing an objective basis for dialogue.

Map and manage conflict actors

Understanding actors is an essential pre-requisite to fruitful conflict management. In the case of Papua, with its vast size and social differentiation, it is a critical, if neglected, issue. Establishing and maintaining a map of conflict actors is important in order to prepare for a meaningful dialogue process. This needs to be done by relevant government agencies as well as by Papuans. The objective would be to gain agreement on the mapping process with the main stakeholders. It is important to dismantle the often-cited reason for not meaningfully engaging the Papuan community, which is: we don't know who to talk to.

Defining the agenda for dialogue

The agenda for a dialogue should not solely focus on thorny issues such as the history and political status of Papua. It should provide space to discuss the substance of the OTSUS law, which includes questions related to reconciliation, human rights courts, a new paradigm of development and to an affirmative action policy for Papuans. The process of how an agenda will be defined is crucial. By establishing ownership of the agenda on both sides and

119 Confidential report, Port Moresby, November 2010.

by offering options regarding the future, Papuans might agree to initiate a dialogue on less sensitive issues. Both parties will need to make concessions on the agenda. As in the case of dialogue over the future of Aceh, where genuine special autonomy ended up as the most significant deliverable, it may be a question of having a greater political say in what autonomy means and how it is implemented.

Leverage public support for dialogue

Papuan society is diverse but not chronically fragmented. Papuans themselves recognise that unification among them is a necessary step for dialogue. More support from the wider Papuan population needs to be sought through media campaigns and additional consultations.

Engage migrants

Migrants should be considered important stakeholders with respect to peace in Papua. Migrant leaders have so far not publicly expressed their views concerning a potential Jakarta-Papua dialogue. This is partly because they have very little information about a prospective dialogue and assume that Papuan calls for dialogue are identical to demands for political independence. A better understanding of migrants' grievances and perceptions of dialogue is needed, and a process of public consultation with migrants could lead to their agreement for dialogue to be undertaken and to understanding of their views and opinions.

Assurances for implementation

Whatever the outcome of dialogue will be, any agreement to ensure peace and stability should contain provisions to ensure that such promises materialize. The details and mechanics to facilitate

implementation of the agreement need to be worked out if necessary in an implementation agreement. Some degree of third-party involvement, perhaps as a witness to dialogue, as well as easing the access for journalists and NGOs to Papua would certainly assure the Papuan community of central government sincerity. So would relaxation of the ban on the use of Papuan cultural symbols. Measures need to be credible and long-lasting and this can only be achieved if changes are made on the structural level:

Commence demilitarization and end impunity

It is necessary to promptly respond to credible reports of torture in custody and permanently discharge personnel convicted of serious human rights abuses. The GoI needs to adopt transparent measures to ensure credible, impartial and timely investigations into all future allegations of human rights abuse. Secondly, the visible presence of security forces is perceived by Papuans and experts as unjustified and it is one of the main conflict drivers. The security sector is accused of supporting militias to fight separatism, engaging in illegal business activities and conducting military campaigns and human rights abuses against indigenous Papuans. Clarifying the role and status of the military as well as reducing the number of security forces would signal to the Papuans the GoI's genuine willingness to resolve the conflict and therefore potentially increase stability in the Papua.

Amend the Indonesian criminal code

Amend or repeal all articles of the Indonesian Criminal Code that have been used to imprison individuals for their legitimate peaceful activities, including articles 106 and 110 of the Criminal Code on 'rebellion'.

Papuan Perspectives on Peace in West Papua

Otto Ondawame¹²⁰

“The experiences and the history of Papua have shown that violence has never solved the Papuan conflict [...] the solution to the Papuan conflict lies in peaceful means namely dialogue, which is urgently needed to prevent further bloodshed in the future.”¹²¹

Colonization, conflict and violence in West Papua

The New York Agreement of 15 August 1962 and the ‘Act of Free Choice’ in 1969 are seen by many West Papuans as a gross violation of their human rights. Papuan leaders argue that they were never consulted before the New York Agreement was signed. Papuan Leaders such as myself uphold that the ‘Act of Free Choice’ was not conducted in line with the international standard of one person, one vote. Of the potential 1.5 million voting West Papuans only 1,025 so-called ‘representatives of the people’ voted, with a significant degree of coercion being involved.¹²² Therefore, for many Papuans, the legal legitimacy of Indonesian claims over West Papua is questionable. The current political status of West Papua is nothing else than a colony of Indonesia for obvious reasons. As one observer has put it: *“Today, West Papua is an Indonesian colony that means West Papua’s resources that belong to the people of West Papua are used and exploited by somebody else. . . . West Papua has legal rights to independence”*.¹²³

The Indonesian armed forces have, over the years, conducted a heavy-handed security policy in the region that has involved the documented abuse

of human rights of the people of West Papua and includes alleged extra-judicial killing, execution, torture, intimidation, imprisonment, sexual violence and rape.¹²⁴ The Indonesian government has also actively promoted, as well as passively allowed, widespread discrimination against indigenous people and the influx of migrants that today has reduced the Papuan population to a near minority in its own land.

The biggest social factor has been a massive influx of immigrants from Indonesia into West Papua under both sponsored and spontaneous¹²⁵ “transmigration” programs.¹²⁶ Over the past 48 years, the Papuan population has significantly declined. In 1959 it was estimated that non-Papuans made up 2 per cent of the total population. In 2011 the number is expected to rise to 53.5 per cent. If migration continues at the same rate, the percentage of indigenous Papuans will shrink to 15.2 per cent in 2030.¹²⁷ Estimations differ but the serious marginalization of the people of West Papua is not in doubt.

- Discrimination in jobs, health services, and education: as a result non Papuans dominate the economy;
- An unequal distribution of social services and economic opportunities between Papuans and non-Papuans;
- Exploitation of natural resources, which benefits a small elite and leaves indigenous landowners themselves in poverty;¹²⁸

124 Budiardjo and Liem, (1984); Australian Council for Overseas Aid, *Trouble at Freeport: Eyewitness Account of the West Papuan Resistance to Freeport MacMoRan Mine in Iriaj Jaya, June 1994-February 1995*, (Melbourne: ACFOA, 1995); Amnesty International, *Human Rights Violations in Irian Jaya*, (Geneva: AI Publications, 1991); Zonggonau W, et al., *Accuses: The Case of West Papua*, (Unpublished document, 1997); Haluk, Markus, *A Report of State Violence in West Papua, Consensus Working Committee*, (Jayapura: Papua National Consensus Working Team, 2009).

125 The sponsored transmigration program is supported by the government and aims to shift the landless and peasants, mainly from Java and Bali, to outer islands in Indonesia, including West Papua. Spontaneous transmigrants are those who come of their own accord and under their own costs. Most of them come from Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara, Kalimantan, Moluccas and Sumatra.

126 Septer Manufandu states: “One ship brought in 2,206 migrants every week. If there are three ships, it will be 6,618 migrants every week. A month will be 26,472 and a year will be 317, 664. If it takes seven years, the number of immigrants in Jayapura alone will reach 2,223,648. Papuans become a minority group in their own soil.” See, Manufandu, Septer, “Demographic Disaster in West Papua”, *West Papuan Update*, (Jayapura: Papuan NGOs Cooperation Forum, 2009), p.26.

127 Manufandu, Septer, (2009) p.25.

128 It is estimated that 81.5 per cent of Papuan live under the poverty line. See Manufandu, Septer, (2009), p.22.

120 Otto Ondawame uses the term West Papua referring to Papua and West Papua province. The views expressed in his article do not necessarily reflect the views of the HD Centre or LIPI.

121 Tebay, Neles, (2009) p.2.

122 Ondawame, Otto, “Comments”, In Lyubomir Ivanov (Ed.), *The Future of the Falkland Islands and Its People*, (Sofia: Double T Publishers, 2003) p.63. See also: Ondawame, Otto, “The Colonial Politics of Papuan Rights”, In Bienek, Janusz and Trompf, Garry (Eds.), *Historical Perspective, Plight of Papuan Religion and Politics in West Papua (or Irian Jaya)*, (Mt: Hagen: Michelite Community in PNG and Australia, 2003), p.103.

123 Janki, Melinda, Statement of the Co-Chairperson of the International Lawyers for West Papua, speaking during the launch of the European Parliament for West Papua, Brussels, 26 January 2010. See www.youtube.com/Watch?v=vqKr4bSPP71

- Prohibiting the use of Papuan culture, languages, tradition, and ways of life and national symbols such as the *Morning Star Flag*;¹²⁹
- The spread of HIV/AIDS from sex-workers arriving in West Papua from other parts of Indonesia. As of 2009, 4,500 suffer from HIV and 1,055 from AIDS in West Papua.¹³⁰ Comparatively, the level of HIV/AIDS in West Papua is much higher than in other parts of “Indonesia” and Papua New Guinea.

The Free Papua Movement and West Papua National Coalition for Liberation

Papuan people have engaged in various forms of resistance to Indonesian rule. This section will focus on two key actors: the *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (OPM) or Free Papua Movement, and the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation (the Coalition).¹³¹ The central objectives of the OPM and the Coalition are to liberate the people of West Papua from Indonesian colonialism, discrimination, exploitation, and to establish a democratic, just, peaceful and prosperous independent state of West Papua.¹³²

The OPM

The resistance movement came to life on July 26, 1965 with the creation of the OPM. However, a silent resistance movement had already started in West Papua during the Dutch Colonial period. Ferry Awom¹³³, with the *Papuan Kasuari Battalion*¹³⁴ and

employees of the department of forestry and agriculture¹³⁵, declared an independent Papuan state after attacks on military and police posts.¹³⁶ Although the movement was crushed four days later by the Indonesian military, it fuelled Papuan nationalism and the OPM increased its military activities in the border region with Papua New Guinea. All military activities were carried out by the OPM in the early period but since the establishment of the National Liberation Army of West Papua (NLAWP) in 1968, military activities have been carried out by the NLAWP. Its political vision and mission was to achieve independence for West Papua by destroying Indonesian colonialism. Simultaneously, Papuan leaders in the Netherlands established the National Liberation Council (NLC) in 1968, which was responsible for political lobbying.¹³⁷ The relationship between the OPM inside Papua and the NLC in the Netherlands was good. The leaders of the NLC advised the leaders of the OPM, and the NLC supported independence.

The OPM, through the President of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of West Papua, General Seth Rumkorem, again unilaterally declared independence on 1 July 1971. He called for a fair and democratic referendum under the direct supervision of the UN. However, in 1976 the leadership split between the two main leaders of the OPM; Jacob H. Prai, who was Chair of the Senate of the West Papuan Provisional Parliament, and Seth Rumkorem. This caused a restructuring and re-orientation of the OPM, which widened its influence and decentralized power within the organization. More negatively, the split caused internal power struggles which threatened both the OPM’s unity and reputation.¹³⁸

Seth Rumkorem led a military unit called *Tentara Pembebasan Nasional* (TPN) or the National Liberation Army. He established four regional command structures mostly in the northern parts of West Papua such as Biak, Japen-Waropen, Manokwari and Sorong. Jacob H. Prai led a group called *Pembela*

129 Specifically, “Government regulation No: 77/2007 prohibited the use of Morning Star-the flag of the OPM as cultural symbol”. Agus, Alua, ‘MRP described as a child who was born in the jungle’ *Cenderawasih Pos*, 19 June, (2010).

130 In the gold mining district of Degeuwo in Paniai regency, there are 234 sex workers (from Jakarta and Surabaya) and some 152 people were reportedly infected by HIV and AIDS in the gold mining area between 2007 and 2009. See Manufandu, Septer, (2009), p.28.

131 The OPM is the main resistance movement in West Papua which has a political and military wing. The military wing of the OPM is called *Tentara Pembebasan Nasional* (TPN). The Coalition aims to bring all resistance movements into one body for national unity and the unification of common perceptions. More than 28 resistance movements, including the OPM, joined the Coalition.

132 Ondawame, Otto, *One People, One Soul, West Papuan Nationalism and the Organisasi Papua Merdeka*, (Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, Political Program, 2010), p.85-86.

133 Ferry Awom was a member of the Papuan Voluntary Forces (called the *Papuan Kasuari Battalion*) and was trained by the Dutch to defend West Papua from the Indonesian occupation.

134 The Papuan Kasuari Battalion was formed during the Dutch colonial administration and aimed to defend West Papua from an Indonesian invasion in 1962 during a brief war between the Dutch and Indonesia.

135 Manokwari was the main training centre for agriculture and forestry in West Papua during the Dutch Administration and, as a result, workers were elite and understood their rights to self-determination and independence well. For this reason, they joined the Kasuari Battalion.

136 MacDougall, J., “Sebuah Cita-cita dari Hutan Irian”, *Apakabar Daily Newspapers*, Jakarta, 25 September, (1995). See also: Ondawame, Otto (2010), p.64.

137 Ondawame, Otto (2010), pp.74-78.

138 Ondawame, Otto (2010), pp.81-110.

Keadilan (PEMKA or the Restoration of Justice group). The Port Vila Peace Declaration in 1985 led to the two groups merging.

The OPM was commanded by General Matthias Wenda up to 2008, and then by Kelly Kwalik, who was shot by the Indonesian police in December 2009. It is now led by General Richard Youweni, Chairman of the OPM and Coalition. He is serving as Acting Supreme Commander of the TPN until an official decision is made on who will fill the post.¹³⁹

The purpose of the military wing is to launch campaigns to protect the lives of indigenous Papuans from the Indonesian military and to destroy the colonial occupation forces, its facilities, and its allies.

The OPM now consists of two wings: military (TPN) and political. The purpose of the military wing is to launch campaigns to protect the lives of indigenous Papuans from the Indonesian military and to destroy the colonial occupation forces, its facilities, and its allies. The military wing has nine regional commands – which makes co-ordination a key challenge. The supreme TPN commander, together with the Chair of the Coalition, is responsible for military initiatives.¹⁴⁰ The political wing operates inside and outside of West Papua and has offices in Sweden (since 1998) and Vanuatu (since 2003). The office in Malmö (Sweden) is responsible for diplomatic outreach, public education campaigns and fundraising, whereas the Vanuatu office (which is also the secretariat of the Coalition) leads on international campaigning. Both wings, with a few exceptions, support dialogue as a viable method to resolve the conflict. In addition, the OPM and the Coalition work closely with groups in London and New York.¹⁴¹

The OPM argues that all Papuans that support independence are members of the OPM. The OPM claims that they have never received weapons from

abroad and that their most effective arms are traditional weapons, which include spears and knives as well as bows and arrows.

The Coalition

The Coalition was established to set an effective political agenda.¹⁴² It has provided new direction for the OPM and helped to improve its image, leadership, and organizational structure. To take into account the independence of each member of the Coalition, it has a less formal structure than other organizations.

To co-ordinate effectively between its members, the Coalition is structured as follows: the National Congress is the highest body in the Coalition. Its decisions are implemented by the National Executive Council. The Secretary General runs the daily administrative operation, assisted by the Coordinator of the Congress. The Secretary General appoints representatives for Desk, Bureau and General Administration, and the Ad Hoc Committee. Inside Papua, the Coalition is led by Richard Youweni, the Leader of the OPM and Chairperson of the Coalition. The Chair is supported by the Committee, which is responsible for the socialization of the Coalition's program, the promotion of peaceful dialogue and reconciliation, and also for mobilizing the public. The current chair of the Ad Hoc Committee is Alberth Kaleile. Branches of the committee operating in each province and regency in West Papua are under the co-ordination of the Ad Hoc Central Committee based in Port Numbay (Jayapura). Abroad, we have appointed representatives to select countries to assist the Coordinator of International Relations.

The Coalition has also gained more regional and international recognition for West Papuan issues. In 2010, the Government of Vanuatu, for example, expressed its full support for both the Coalition and the broader goal of independence for West Papua.¹⁴³

139 A new Supreme Commander of the TPN will be appointed soon. General Jack Kemong is Regional Commander of *Nemangkawi* Command of the TPN in the Southern Highland region.

140 It is interesting to note that the Chair of the Coalition is also the Chairperson of the OPM.

141 A small section within the political and military wings believes in armed struggle as a viable alternative to conflict resolution in West Papua. They are represented by the older generation and militant section of the OPM.

142 Among the leaders are: General Richard Youweni, Chairperson Dr. Otto Ondawame, Vice Chairperson; Mr. Rex Rumakiek, Secretary General. The late General Kelly Kwalik, Supreme Commander of the TPN, was also a leader. In addition, several country representatives were appointed. At the moment, two-thirds of the Coalition's Executive Council is from the OPM and TPN.

143 The Government of Vanuatu has given support to the people of West Papua for several decades. Most recently this was reaffirmed in 2009 by Bakon Kaltonga, 'Communique on West Papua, Statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade', 17 April. On 18 June 2010, the Vanuatu Parliament unanimously passed a resolution affirming their support for the independence of West Papua.

Consulting within the movement

Since 2003, a dedicated consultation effort has been taken within the movement as part of the reconciliation and unification process. This has included a series of meetings which have helped groups in West Papua to reach common positions and better prepare themselves for any dialogue with the Indonesian government (see annex for full list of meetings and their outcomes).¹⁴⁴

Priorities of the OPM and Coalition

To achieve more significant national unity, further reconciliation is needed and the following approaches should be taken:

- *Reconciliation amongst Papuans is a priority.* The fragmentation of Papuan society is a major challenge for peace. Reconciliation must be encouraged both inside and outside Papua.
- *Support the ongoing consultation in West Papua led by Father Dr. Neles Tebay and the Coalition's Working Group.*¹⁴⁵ The consultation meetings suggested by Tebay, which the Coalition supports, include meetings among Papuans in West Papua; between Papuan leaders abroad; between leaders of factions in Papua and leaders of the OPM abroad; between political leaders of the OPM and regional commanders of the TPN; and, finally, Papua internal reconciliation.¹⁴⁶ Internal reconciliation is important to unify common perceptions, to form a team of negotiators and to decide about the agenda for international peaceful dialogue.
- *Build an effective channel of communication between peace process delegates and local constituencies,* particularly the military wings of the OPM. For example, internal meetings between OPM political leaders and regional military commanders are needed prior to any peace talks.
- *Find appropriate ways to encourage the Indonesian Government to engage in dialogue.* Jakarta has so far been very reluctant to do so despite

the many calls for peaceful talks from the OPM and the Coalition. The Coalition had approached the Government and expressed its views on four occasions in the recent past.¹⁴⁷ However, so far Jakarta has not responded to those calls. Over five years ago, the leaders of the *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM), or Free Aceh Movement, called for peace talks which led to the Helsinki Accord in 2005. Jakarta argued that dialogue became possible because of the GAM's clear leadership and effective military forces. The Coalition, therefore, focuses on unifying the Papuan leadership to demonstrate the genuine willingness of Papuans to engage with the Government. There are, however, other ways Jakarta can signal support. One is to implement LIPI's *Papua Road Map*.¹⁴⁸

Melanesian conflict resolution styles and approaches

*"So long as any Pacific Islands remain colonized, none of us is free".*¹⁴⁹

Melanesian approaches to conflict and its resolution are quite different to that of Indonesians. Melanesian people express their emotion directly and the society is built upon a 'Bigman' culture. A man becomes Bigman (Chief) because he has certain abilities such as oral abilities, leadership, organizational skills, wealth and is trusted with the responsibility to declare war and broker peace. From the cultural perspective, the Council of Bigmen (Council of Chiefs) plays an important role in conflict resolution.

Melanesians typically employ a consultative (*musyawarah*) approach to solve conflict. While Indonesians also apply *musyawarah*, the meaning of the term is different for Indonesians and Melanesians.

¹⁴⁴ All previous reconciliation meetings have been funded by local supporters. However, the meetings in Ipoh and Port Vila were partly funded by the Olof Palme Peace Foundation in Stockholm.

¹⁴⁵ The Working Group is the new term for what used to be called the Task Force for Peace and Reconciliation. The name was changed after the Port Vila Leaders Summit. The main tasks of this group are to promote reconciliation and to socialize the Coalition's policies and programs.

¹⁴⁶ Correspondence between Otto Ondawame and Dr. Neles Tebay, 5 May 2010.

¹⁴⁷ Otto Ondawame, then Secretary General of the Coalition, wrote a letter to the Indonesian President, Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2006 calling for peaceful dialogue. Jakarta did not reply so the Secretary General of the Coalition called once again for dialogue in November 2007. On October 15, 2009, the new Secretary General of the Coalition Rex Rumakiek, wrote another letter to the president to call for peace talks. On August 6, 2010, the latest letter was sent via the president's special envoy, Dr. Felix Wanggai, urging the president to engage in the process of international peaceful dialogue.

¹⁴⁸ Widjojo, Muridan, (Ed.), (2009).

¹⁴⁹ Preamble of the Petition to the Prime Minister and the Government of Vanuatu of the people of Vanuatu, concerning the Support of the Government of Vanuatu for Independence of West Papua, 5 March 2010, Port Vila.

In the Melanesian understanding it is defined as a process to compile opinions about solutions. All members of the community must be approached and listened to so that they feel a sense of ownership and their view is considered in the decision-making. Therefore, the Coalition stresses the value of internal consolidation before it enters into a potential dialogue with Indonesia. In contrast, in the Indonesian understanding, conducting consultations means to reach a final agreement.

Papuans are generally considered by Melanesians as part of their ‘family’, sharing social and cultural features. Consequently, Melanesian governments have traditionally informally supported the cause of the Papuans.

Papuans are generally considered by Melanesians as part of their ‘family’, sharing social and cultural features. Consequently, Melanesian governments have traditionally informally supported the cause of the Papuans. The Government of Vanuatu, for example, has actively promoted the issue of West Papua both at regional and international forums. By the same token, West Papua historically took part in regional political, economic, social, cultural and religious initiatives launched during the decolonization period in the 1950s and early 1960s. In 1950, West Papua was a founding member of the Pacific Economic Commission, which is today known as the Pacific Islands Forum. Moreover, West Papuan churches were one of the founding members of the Pacific Council of Churches (today known as the Pacific Conference of Churches) and it actively participated in the Pacific Games, art festivals and student exchange programs.

Recommendations

As a result of LIPI’s and Father Neles’ work, the idea of dialogue as a conflict management tool has become part of the public discourse in Indonesia, and is accepted among many stakeholders on both sides as one of the keys to resolving the conflict in Papua. Papuan society and the resistance movement is less fragmented and better prepared for a genuine dialogue – and it will become even more ready once the recommendations above on strengthening

Papuan unity are implemented. All resistant movements should be brought into one united body.

But Jakarta has so far been very reluctant to engage in a dialogue despite the many calls for peaceful talks from the OPM and the Coalition. The absence of formal and public support from the Indonesian President for the above-mentioned initiatives for a peaceful resolution of the conflict remains a major challenge. The Indonesian Government needs to take its own steps to make dialogue more likely.

With that in mind, the following recommendations to the Indonesian Government are put forward:

To the Indonesian Government:

1. Consider engaging in a dialogue process to resolve the conflict in West Papua. The President should publicly endorse dialogue and appoint a special envoy.
2. An international meeting should be convened on *The Papua Road Map* drawn up by LIPI. Invitees would be those stakeholders that believe that the Papua conflict can be solved through dialogue.¹⁵⁰ The meeting would end with recommendations addressed to the Indonesian Government.
3. Stop further immigration into West Papua, given the contentious and dislocating nature of the policy for Papuans. The immigration policy is an integral part of the Indonesian Government’s efforts to colonize West Papua.
4. Undertake a process of demilitarization in West Papua to build confidence and trust amongst large sections of the Papuan population. Those nations supplying arms and military equipment to Indonesia should insist that they are not used in Papua.
5. Allow international humanitarian organizations and journalists to enter West Papua to monitor the situation.

To international and regional actors:

Nations in the region and elsewhere should consider how they could potentially play a positive conflict resolution role. New Zealand showed, in the

¹⁵⁰ Stakeholders include participants from West Papua, Indonesia and the international community.

Bougainville peace process, that a neutral facilitator can be very effective. Specifically, a neutral facilitator should organise meetings between delegates from Indonesia and Papua to discuss and agree on an agenda for peace talks, including but not limited to: participants, preconditions and barriers to negotiation, principles, levelling the playing-field, resources for the negotiation, the form of the negotiation, venue and locations, communication and information exchange, setting the substantive agenda, time frames, and decision-making procedures.¹⁵¹

1. Melanesian governments and those belonging to the Pacific Islands Forum should take an active role in promoting peaceful dialogue, the decolonization process and raising the issue at the International Court of Justice. Both are asked to clearly position themselves regarding the status of West Papua and revitalize Melanesian cultural links as a means of cultural diplomacy.
2. The European Union should stop supporting the Special Autonomy Law, because it does not meet the aspirations of Papuans. Furthermore, the European Union must fully support a dialogue process that could lead to fair and equitable outcomes.
3. The USA, the Netherlands and the UN have unresolved moral, and perhaps legal, obligations to the people of West Papua. It is therefore appropriate for them to consider being more active in restoring the dignity and human rights of the people of West Papua. They should call for a genuine referendum in accordance with international law and under the supervision of the UN.

¹⁵¹ Bloomfield, David and Nupen, Charles, "Negotiation Process", In Harris, Peter and Reilly, Ben (Eds.), *Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiations*, (Stockholm: IDEA, 1998), pp.114-118.

Case Study Three

Violent conflict and its management in Poso, Central Sulawesi

Introduction

Communal violent conflict in Poso started on 24 December 1998: Christmas Eve and Ramadan. While the chain of events is contested, most accounts begin with three drunken Christian youths who came to Darussalam mosque in the village of Sayo late in the night of 24 December or in the early hours of 25 December and beat up a youth in a mosque.¹⁵² This incident left Muslims feeling vulnerable, leading them to attack Christian homes. News of this soon spread and many people tried to enter Poso city from the surrounding areas. Muslims came from Tokorondo, Parigi, and Ampana; while Christians armed with machetes came from Sepe, Silanca and Tentena. Riots continued until 29 December, spilling beyond the borders of the city and into towns along Poso's three major access roads.¹⁵³

Although the conflict reflected religious divisions, it was also driven by local elites who are alleged to have encouraged the violence. As one former vice district head (*wakil bupati*) put it: "*The conflict in Poso was not because of religion. During the conflict someone burned churches and mosques in order to prolong the conflict. What for? The longer the riots,*

the more the money. Someone benefited from the conflict."¹⁵⁴

A particular point of contention was who held the position of district head (*bupati*). The convention in Poso had been to alternate the position between a Christian and a Muslim, a practice that the district head, Arif Patanga – a Muslim – did not follow.¹⁵⁵

After the week's violence, there were few attacks by either Christians or Muslims until April 2000, which marked the beginning of the conflict's second phase. The pause in violence is commonly attributed to national elections held in June 1999 and district head elections held in October 1999, when political elites sought to gain the support of both communities. On 16 April 2000, a fight amongst Muslim and Christian youths started in a Poso bus terminal in Lombogia village, a predominantly Christian area. Muslims began to attack houses in Lombogia and burned down its major church.

Christians sought revenge. The third phase of the conflict began in May 2000 when a Christian group known as the Army of the Bat (sometimes referred to as *pasukan kelelawar* or ninjas) led by Fabianus Tibo killed three people in Mo-Engko village. Violence escalated significantly when an attack was launched on Situwu Lemba village, also known as Kilo Sembilan (Kilo Nine). The village was home to Muslim Javanese transmigrants and housed a Muslim boarding school, or *pesantren*, called Wali Songo. Around 70 people were killed or disappeared in the attack. Poso city was targeted, prompting the displacement of many Muslims

152 Ecip, Sinansari, *Rusuh Poso Rujuk Malino*, (Jakarta: Cahaya Timur, 2002). See also: Lasahido, Tahmidy, *Suara dari Poso, Kerusuhan, Konflik dan Resolusi*, (Jakarta: YAPPIKA, 2003); Karnavian, Tito, *Indonesian Top Secret, Membongkar Konflik Poso*, (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2008).

153 Lasahido, Tahmidy, *Suara dari Poso, Kerusuhan, Konflik dan Resolusi*, (Jakarta: YAPPIKA, 2003).

154 Interview Johari Efendi & Akiko Horiba with a former vice Bupati, Poso, 12 March 2010.

155 Aditjondro, George, *Kerusuhan Poso dan Morowali, Akar Permasalahan dan Jalan Keluarnya*, (Jakarta, ProPatria 2004); Arianto, Sangaji (2005), *Rumput Kering di Balik Anyir Darah Konteks Etno Religius dari Tragedi Kemanusiaan Poso*, (Palu: Yayasan Tanah Merdeka, 2005).



Security officials and residents, rear, survey the charred wreckage of Christian-owned shops torched by Muslim gangs in Poso, December 6, 2001. © AP Photo/str

from the city. The Kilo Sembilan attack triggered a call to Muslims in surrounding areas to take up arms. It also prompted the Indonesian army to deploy in much larger numbers.¹⁵⁶

In August 2000, President Abdurrahman Wahid was invited by the four Governors from Sulawesi for a peace meeting, gathering 14 traditional (*adat*) leaders from Poso district. The initiative, known as *Rujuk Sintuwu Maroso*, was arranged by the provincial government, authorities from Poso district, and the four Governors in Sulawesi – but it had little effect.


In April 2001, the growing anger of the Muslim community was reflected in their call for the death penalty against the three Christians – Fabianus Tibo, Marinus Riwu and Domingus Dasilva – who had been accused of involvement in the Kilo Sembilan attack. Extremists groups from outside

Poso sought to exploit this anger and, in July 2001, thousands of members of Laskar Jihad (a Muslim militia based in Java) arrived in Poso, marking the beginning of the fourth phase of the conflict. Their entry into the conflict changed its dynamics, giving a significant boost to Muslims, who attacked and burned Christian villages around Poso city. The conflict became much more one-sided.

In December 2001, a co-ordinated attack by Muslim groups took place on multiple villages, from Betalembah to Sanginora, marking the beginning of the fifth phase of the conflict. The central government sent 2000 troops to try and control the violence in Poso, bringing the total number of security forces in the area to around 3500. At the same time, the Government sponsored peace talks which culminated in the Malino Peace Declaration (Malino I) signed on 21 December 2001 by Muslim and Christian leaders. It called on all parties to end all violence and, despite its shortcomings, it did have some effect. Direct clashes between the two

¹⁵⁶ Ecip, Sinansari, (2002), pp.20-23.

Figure 1: Map of Poso



Courtesy of the UN OCHA Regional Office for Asia-Pacific, 2011.

communities decreased, although sporadic bombings and shootings continued with the vast majority committed by Muslim groups. The three Christians suspected of carrying out the Kilo Sembilan attack were executed in September 2006, which in turn provoked several violent incidents in protest.

Part of the success in reducing the violence can be attributed to the security forces, who grew in confidence after Malino I was signed and became more committed to arresting those carrying out attacks. Perhaps the apex of this was a 2007 police raid on Tanah Runtu, which had been a base for Laskar Mujahidin and local Laskars, and a previous no-go zone.¹⁵⁷ However, the fact that years of conflict had led to segregated communities – with Muslims centred around Poso and Christians around Tentena – also removed some of the motivations for committing attacks as well as the ability to do so.

Historical context

Poso has a long history of religious communities living alongside one another – in tension but largely without significant violence. Islam was introduced to Poso's coastal areas by Muslim traders from Bugis and Arabs, while highlanders remained animistic. In the late 1800s, the Dutch extended their colonial rule to the region and Christianity was introduced, particularly in the highland areas. Their conversion gave them favoured status amongst the Dutch. The headquarters of the Christian Reformed Church was established in Tentena around Poso lake. The indigenous people of Poso are known as Pamona. In Tentena, indigenous communities became united through their shared colonial experience and a strong church network. Pamona identity is complex and contested – it started as a geographical and linguistic grouping in the highlands but as coastal areas became more Muslim and highlands more Christian, it acquired a Christian religious dimension too. Thus the colonial experience produced identities oriented around religion, and also led to communities that were increasingly geographically segregated.

¹⁵⁷ These groups prolonged the Poso conflict by additional bomb attacks. The Malino agreement was a turning point of the conflict however it was not the end of violence. The latter was achieved only after the raid on Tanah Runtu.

Box 1: Timeline of the conflict in Poso¹⁵⁸

First phase		
1998	December	Riots begin on Christmas eve during the month of Ramadan, lasting three days.
1999	June	General election in Indonesia.
	October	Morowali district is created from part of Poso district. New bupati and vice bupati, both Muslim, are selected.
		Herman Parimo, a significant Christian leader, is brought to the court and sentenced to jail for 15 years for his role in provoking the 1998 conflict. Agfar Patanga, the brother of district chief Arif Patanga is given six months in jail for his role.
	Yahya Patiro, a bupati candidate, is attacked in Hotel Wisata in Poso city.	
Second phase		
2000	April	A fight amongst Muslim and Christian youths starts in a Poso bus terminal in Lombogia, evolving into rioting that displaces large numbers of Christians.
Third phase		
2000	May	A Christian group led by Fabianus Tibo marches towards Poso city and kills three people in Mo-Engko village. A boarding house in Kilo Sembilan is attacked, leaving more than 70 people dead. Many are displaced from Poso city.
	June	Widespread conflict spreads throughout Poso.
	August	President Wahid visits Poso. Rujuk Sintuwu Maroso ceremony for reconciliation is held.
2001	April	Muslims call for the death penalty against three Christians accused of involvement in the Kilo Sembilan attack.
	June	The three Christians involved in the Kilo Sembilan attack are brought to court.
Fourth phase		
2001	July	Christians march from Tentena to Poso to demand that land is returned to them. An attack in Buyung Katedo leaves 14 Muslims dead, prompting retaliatory actions by Muslims in Poso city. Laskar Jihad arrives in Poso.
Fifth phase		
2001	December	People from Tabalu village attack villages from Betalembah to Sanginora. The Malino Peace Declaration (Malino I) is negotiated.
Post Malino I phase		
2002		Bomb explosions and shooting attacks sporadically occur in Poso district throughout the year.
2003	December	Tojo una-una district is created from part of Poso district.
2003–2004		Several mysterious attacks take place in numerous villages. Bombings are carried out in Poso.
2005	May	A bomb explodes in a market in Tentena, the largest attack of its kind.
	August	A mysterious attack in Sepe-Silanca village leaves five people dead.
	October	Three Christian high school students are beheaded.
2006	September	Christian leader, Fabianus Tibo and two others accused of leading the Kilo Sembilan attack, are executed.
	October	The police announce a list of 29 people whom they allege were involved in the conflict.
2007	January	The first and second police operations against terrorist groups are carried out.

158 A detailed description of the Poso conflict in five phases can be found here: Lasahido, Tahmidy (2003); and Ecip, Sinansari, (2002).



An aerial view of the ruins of a burned village in Poso, 8 December, 2001. © REUTERS/STR New

During the Soeharto era, a Pamona phrase, *Sintuwu Maroso* ('Strong when United' or 'Strong Union') was propagated by the Government as an attempt to bring highlanders and coastal communities together, but had little effect.¹⁵⁹ Poso became increasingly ethnically diverse during the Soeharto era because of voluntary migration from south Sulawesi and government-sponsored transmigration programmes from Java and Bali that began in the early 1950s. The Trans-Sulawesi Highway that connected north and south Sulawesi facilitated migration, particularly those who came voluntarily outside of any *transmigransi* scheme of the central government. Many people of Bugis origin from south Sulawesi went to Poso in the 1980s because of opportunities offered by the cacao trade. By 1997, just under two-thirds of residents in Poso were

159 Aragon, Lorraine, "Communal Violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi; where people eat fish and fish eat people", *Indonesia, Volume 72* (2001), p.71.

Muslim and a third Christian. Political institutions became increasingly dominated by Muslims.

When national policy shifted towards favouring Islam in the last decade of the New Order, this deepened the community's perceptions of past economic and political favouritism toward Muslims and contributed to present and future discrimination toward Christians. With the increase in the number of Muslim immigrants, as well as their increasing domination of the economic sector, tensions between the two religious communities grew, especially over political power.

Though tensions between Muslims and Christians were growing well before 1998, overt violence was rare, an exception being an attack in 1995 by a group of Christian youths from Madale village who destroyed a mosque and Islamic school in Tegalrejo village. Such tensions could be adequately managed by the police and military.¹⁶⁰

160 Lasahido, Tahmidy (2003), p.40.

Conflict resolution initiatives

Local government initiatives

There were many conflict management initiatives conducted by provincial, district and individual elites – most of which were ineffective because there was little co-ordination between the provincial and district governments. As a result, there was a failure to pair the comparative advantages possessed by the provincial government (financial resources) and district governments (extensive local networks and geographical knowledge).

The district government's initiative would not have been successful without the active involvement of local community leaders – indeed, the local government's role was more to convene significant stakeholders and facilitate discussions on stopping the violence.

In the first phase of the conflict the district head (*bupati*), Arif Patanga, convened a series of meetings including an urgent assembly of district leaders or *Musyawah Pimpinan Daerah* (MUSPIDA) after riots broke out on the night of 24 December 1998. The meeting was held on the evening of 25 December to consider how to respond to the violence.¹⁶¹ This assembly consisted of local parliamentarians, the military, the police, attorneys, judges, religious and community leaders. The Christian and Muslim representatives signed a declaration that called on people who are not from Poso city to return to their villages and for Christian and Muslims communities not to create any disturbances. The group also decided to restrict the selling of alcohol in Poso district in an attempt to minimise violence, as Muslims had previously attacked shops, hotels and restaurants that were found selling alcohol. On 27 December, Arif Patanga and others who were part of the MUSPIDA went to areas where people were gathered to urge an end to the violence. Islamic and Christian religious leaders embraced each other as a public display of co-operation. This MUSPIDA temporarily halted the violence.¹⁶²

161 Karnavian, Tito (2008), p.53.

162 Ecip, Sinansari (2002), pp.9-10; Interview by Johari Efendi & Akiko Horiba with Yahya Mangun, Muslim leader in Lawanga, Poso City, Poso, 10 March 2010.

The district government's initiative would not have been successful without the active involvement of local community leaders – indeed, the local government's role was more to convene significant stakeholders and facilitate discussions on stopping the violence. Their task was made easier by the fact that, at this stage of the conflict, neither radical groups nor security forces from outside Poso were involved. Fewer interests were at stake at this point. Violence was unplanned, as evidenced by the traditional weapons used (as opposed to the arms procured in later stages of the conflict).¹⁶³

In the second phase of the conflict the police stood between groups of Muslims and Christians but, in a futile attempt to stem the violence, ending up shooting at both. Since Muslims were perpetrating most of the attacks, they made up most of the victims which exacerbated tensions further. An additional 200 security personnel were deployed from Palu.¹⁶⁴ On 18 April the Governor of Central Sulawesi province visited Poso appealing for calm.

Meetings took place between community leaders and district government officials on 17 and 23 April 2000.¹⁶⁵ At the first meeting it was agreed that all should work together to prevent those outside Poso from entering the city, while at the second meeting Muslims demanded the withdrawal of the Mobile Brigade police (*Brigade Mobil*, or *BRIMOB*) because of their supposedly unconstructive role. The conflict had become harder to control than during the first phase. As one former vice-bupati put it:

*“The first riots happened from 25 to 27 December 1998. In one week the riots ended. We reacted quickly and could control the situation by co-ordinating with village leaders and local religious leaders. However, when the violence happened again in April 2000, many outside elements were involved in the conflict.”*¹⁶⁶

Outside elements in this context refers to political issues, particularly the resentment of the Christian

163 Interview by Johari Efendi with Daud Somba, an NGO worker in Poso, Poso, 10 December 2010.

164 Before the conflict began, there were 200 security personnel in Poso. An additional 300 police were deployed soon after the first phase of the conflict. On 17 April an additional 100 personnel from the army and 100 from the police were deployed, bringing the total to 700 security staff. Ecip, Sinansari (2002), p. 15.

165 Lasahido, Tahmidy (2003), p.50. See also: Ecip, Sinansari (2002), p.96.

166 Interview by Johari Efendi & Akiko Horiba with a former vice *bupati* of Poso, Poso, 10 March 2010.

community for not securing any positions in the *bupati* elections. On 19 April the *bupati* of Poso, MUSPIDA's members, and Muslim religious leaders travelled around the district to urge people to calm down and to return to their villages. By the time another meeting was held on 23 April between local leaders and the district government, mass violence had subsided.¹⁶⁷

However, when fresh violence broke out in May 2000 during the third phase of the conflict more modern weapons were used and there was greater co-ordination and planning of attacks.¹⁶⁸ On 24 May, Christian groups came from the south in and around Tentena and attacked Poso from five different directions including the attacks on Mo-Engko village and Kilo Sembilan. When the district government in Poso called the sub-district government in Tentena to ask if rumours of an impending attack were true, the Tentena officials denied any knowledge, though they could have been reasonably expected to know of such plans. Police who tried to come to the area from Makassar were blocked from entering Poso by logs laid on the road.

In response, the local government and security forces set up a joint assembly on 12 June 2000 made up of those involved in the previous MUSPIDA and religious leaders. They called on both the Christian and Muslim communities to surrender their weapons by 15 June. No weapons were handed in.¹⁶⁹

Other initiatives included a meeting in Manado of the four Governors of Sulawesi which produced a six point agreement.¹⁷⁰ The Governors subsequently issued a statement in August 2000 at their yearly meeting, emphasising that conflict was the common enemy of the people in Sulawesi and resolved to invite President Wahid to Poso. After the meeting, the Central Sulawesi Governor visited President Wahid to request his help and invite him to Poso, which the President accepted. A debate between

the Governors and officials from Poso district then followed about how best to welcome the President. The Governors settled on the idea of using *adat*¹⁷¹ and holding a traditional, community-based reconciliation ceremony. The Governors established a group of 13 traditional leaders (*ketua dewan adat*) titled *Rujuk Sintuwu Maroso* or 'Rebuilding Strong Unity'.

On 22 August 2000, President Wahid came to Poso and the *Rujuk Sintuwu Maroso* agreement was read in front of the President, using the Pamona language. However, not everyone in Poso identified with the use of *adat*, the Pamona language and the 13 traditional leaders selected – particularly migrants from Java and Bugis – and therefore for them the agreement held little meaning. The use of *adat* was, to some extent inappropriate, since it was religious leaders and not *adat* leaders who were more active in the conflict. Most critically, *adat* leaders are centred around particular ethnic sub-divisions rather than geography. Therefore, when 13 *adat* leaders were chosen to represent 13 sub-districts to form a *dewan adat* (*adat* council), this was not in line with traditional practice. Following the presidential visit, the provincial government created a *Rujuk Sintuwu Maroso* reconciliation team but the initiative had little buy-in from the Poso district chief and so failed to make any progress.

The provincial government also made a request to the central government regarding *pemekaran*, or the sub-division of local governments. Within Poso district, a separate district of Morowali was created in October 1999, and Tojo una-una in December 2003. While this was a product of competition for resources amongst elites and a reflection of different ethnic groups' desire to govern themselves – and not intended to be a conflict management strategy – it had an important effect on the conflict.

Politics in Poso had become a competition between three groups: those from Tojo, the Bungku, and the Pamona.¹⁷² When Poso was one large constituency, competition between the three groups was fierce – but once separated into three areas through *pemekaran*, each could hold power in their own areas. *Pemekaran* created employment

167 Rozi, Syafuan, Mashad, Dhurorudin et. al. (2005), *Hubungan Negara dan Masyarakat dalam Resolusi Konflik di Indonesia, Daerah Konflik Sulteng, Maluku dan Malut*, (Jakarta: LIPI Press, 2005). See also: Ecip, Sinansari (2002), p.96.

168 Rozi, Syafuan, Mashad, Dhurorudin et al. (2005), p.43.

169 Lasahido, Tahmidy (2003), p.63.

170 The meeting took place on 28th July 2000 and was attended by the four Governors in Sulawesi (North Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, South Sulawesi and South East Sulawesi). The six agreed points were (1) to become free from all kinds of conflict (2) to have a subsequent meeting in Tentena (3) to ask the President for aid (4) to ask for aid from international donors (5) to involve informal leaders in the reconciliation process at every level and (6) to provide psychological assistance to IDPs. Ecip, Sinansari (2002), p. 97.

171 *Adat* is the group of customary laws or the unwritten traditional code that regulates social political, and economic practices, as well as dispute resolution.

172 Significant figures include: Arif Patanga from the Tojo; Abdul Muin Pusadan from the Bungku; and Yahya Patiro and Eddy Bungkudapu from the Pamona.

opportunities and political positions which gave elites, in particular, a route to power other than through conflict. Many people returned from Poso to their original homes to become involved in newly created local governments.

Central government initiatives

One of the most significant central government conflict resolution initiatives was the Malino Peace Declaration of December 2001, often referred to as Malino I. From inception to completion, the entire process took less than two months. In November 2001, a prominent Christian leader, Pastor Tubondo, went to Jakarta to see the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono), the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare (Jusuf Kalla) and the Minister of Defense (Abdul Jalil). He asked the central government to resolve the conflict in Poso and, given his senior position in the church, this was interpreted as a sign that the Christian community more broadly was ready for peace. This was unsurprising given that the Christian community had been on the receiving end of more recent attacks.¹⁷³

Jusuf Kalla, who is from Sulawesi and has a strong network there, sent a small team to Poso and Tentena to assess the situation and selected a group of ten Christians and ten Muslims with which to consult.¹⁷⁴ On 14 December 2001, Jusuf Kalla met separately with these small groups in Makassar and presented them with three options: let the conflict continue, use security forces to take assertive action, or have the Government facilitate a peace agreement.¹⁷⁵ When framed in this way, the groups opted for peace negotiations and so Jusuf Kalla resolved to host peace talks involving 25 Muslims and 23 Christians.

The Government's warm reception may have partly been driven by pressure from the United States (in the months following the attacks of September 11, 2001) to take action against Muslim radical groups. To some degree, this prompted the Indonesian

Government to demonstrate a serious commitment to conflict resolution, particularly once the US military was seen to be active in Mindanao in the Philippines, close to Sulawesi.¹⁷⁶

The fact that the conflict had broadened to encompass radical groups such as Laskar Jihad also heightened international concern.

The fact that the conflict had broadened to encompass radical groups such as Laskar Jihad also heightened international concern. A statement by Hendro Priyono, head of Indonesia's State Intelligence Agency (*Badan Intelijen Negara*), claiming that Poso was home to terrorist training camps received particular attention.¹⁷⁷

Within the Christian community, a meeting of community leaders was held in Tentena to decide on the representatives to be sent to the Malino peace talks. The 23 delegates came from across the conflict-affected area and included people who were academics, youth, religious leaders representatives. Two women from Tentena participated in the peace talks from the Christian community. The process of selecting representatives from the Muslim community was more 'top-down' and problematic (which reflected how fractured and decentralised leadership in the Muslim community was) and out of the 25 Muslim representatives, 12 came from Palu, the provincial capital largely untouched by the conflict. Only one woman from Poso was involved in the peace talks from the Muslim side.

Once the representatives had been selected, Malino I was concluded in a three-day meeting. On day one, Christians and Muslims arrived in Makassar in South Sulawesi, but stayed in different hotels. They were brought to Malino, 70 km from Makassar, on day two when the Government presented them with a draft agreement. Discussions took place on what to change in the draft, though never with both groups in the same room. A redraft was presented and signed on the third day.¹⁷⁸ Unsurprisingly, this rapid process led to a lack of buy-in even from the leaders who signed the agreement, let alone the communities they were there to represent.

173 Lasahido, Tahmidy (2003), pp.28-29.

174 Ecip Sinansari (2002), p.89. See also: Syafuan Rozi, Dhurorudin Mashad, et al. (2005), p.47.

175 Ecip, Sinansari (2002), p.85-86. These three options are presented slightly differently in other sources such as Adi Susilo, Taufik, *Membaca JK Biografi Singkat Jusuf Kalla*, (Yogyakarta: Garasi House of Book, 2010). This book states that Jusuf Kalla's three options were: giving weapons and ammunition for both conflicting parties in order to kill each other, deploy additional military to the conflict area, or have the government facilitate peace negotiations.

176 Lasahido, Tahmidy (2003), pp.109-110.

177 Lasahido, Tahmidy (2003), p.70.

178 Interview by Johari Efendi & Akiko Horiba with a lecturer from the Christian University of Tentena who was a representative of the Christian community in the Malino talks, Poso, 12 March 2010.

Box 2: Ten points of the Malino I Declaration

1. To cease all forms of conflict and dispute.
2. To obey efforts to enforce the law and support legal sanctions against lawbreakers.
3. To ask the state apparatus to act firmly and justly to maintain security.
4. In order to create a condition of peace, to reject the imposition of a state of emergency and any foreign party involvement.
5. To dismiss slander and dishonesty against all parties and enforce an attitude of mutual respect, and to forgive for the sake of peaceful coexistence.
6. Poso is an integral part of Indonesia. Therefore every citizen has the right to live, come and stay peacefully and respect local customs.
7. All rights and belongings have to be returned to their lawful owners as they were before the conflict began.
8. To return all displaced people to their respective homes.
9. Together with the Government, to carry out complete rehabilitation of the economic infrastructure.
10. To carry out respective religious laws according to a principle of mutual respect and to abide by all the agreed upon rules, in the form of laws, government regulations, or other regulations.

Following the Malino I Declaration, the leaders who signed it created Malino working groups (*Pokja Malino*) at the province, district, and sub-district levels. At a central government level, the Coordinating Ministry for People's Welfare (*Menko Kesra*) and the Coordinating Ministry for Political and Security Affairs (*Menko Polkam*) established a committee to implement Malino I (*Komisi Pemantauan Pelaksanaan Deklarasi Malino*). The mandate of *Pokja Malino* was decided upon by the provincial government without consultation with district heads or community representatives. It had the limited task of disseminating the terms of Malino I through spreading leaflets and outreach at places of worship. Ideally the *Pokja Malino* should have been given a broader mandate that could have included reconciliation initiatives such as facilitating the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs).

The public lacked clear information about the mandate and budget allocated to *Pokja Malino* and thought it had more autonomy than it did, when in fact its budget was controlled by the provincial

government. Funds for Malino I were reportedly allocated by the provincial government to the security forces and various government agencies. One academic who was a signatory to the Malino declaration recalled that:

*“The people of Poso had a bad image of Pokja Malino because people thought that it had a lot of money but there was no visible implementation . . . people thought that the money disappeared as a result of corruption. However, the fact was that most of the budget was not allocated to Pokja Malino. It was used for security forces and several departments. Pokja Malino did not have enough money. Actually, Pokja Malino should have been an independent organisation. We wanted it to be separate from the government.”*¹⁷⁹

Other central government initiatives on conflict management in Poso included Presidential Instruction (*Inpres*) No.14/2005 which emphasised a coordinated and comprehensive approach to resolving the conflict in Poso by implementing the Malino declaration.¹⁸⁰ *Inpres* No.7/2008 resolved to accelerate development activities in Central Sulawesi.¹⁸¹ However the *Inpres* did not create a separate budget and instead attempted to redirect pre-existing funds. Nor was the district government assigned any specific responsibilities related to its implementation although district officials claim they were best placed to know what the needs were:

*“We do not know the exact total of the Inpres 14 budget. All the budgets should have come to the Poso district for implementation of reconstruction activities. However, the central government channelled aid through the provincial government. Not all of it arrived in Poso district. Money went to each department from the province and we in Poso district could not control anything. . . We know the problems because we are Poso people however we could not decide how to use the money.”*¹⁸²

179 Interview by Johari Efendi & Akiko Horiba with a lecturer from the Tentena Christian University who was a representative of the Christian community in the Malino talks, Poso, 12 March 2010.

180 *Langkah-Langkah Komprehensif Penanganan Permasalahan Poso*, Presidential Instruction, published on 12 October 2005.

181 Presidential Instruction No. 7/2008, 23 August 2008.

182 Interview by Johari Efendi & Akiko Horiba with the vice bupati of Poso, Poso, 10 March 2010.

The Coordinating Ministry for People's Welfare (*Menko Kesra*) was also involved in the distribution of aid for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Poso, initially channelling the aid through district-level *bupati*. In 2005, Menko Kesra gave Rp. 58 billion (USD 5.8 million) to the *bupatis* at the district-level. However, the Menko Kesra did not provide recommendations on how the aid should be used. It overestimated the capacity of district governments who tended to increase spending on existing activities unrelated to the conflict, such as uniforms for the Civil Defence Force (*HANSIP*) rather than develop peacebuilding projects.

In 2007, Menko Kesra prepared another budget for rehabilitation and reconstruction of Poso estimated at Rp. 18 billion (USD 1.98 million). However, this time Menko Kesra did not distribute the aid through the district government and instead decided to give the aid directly to community groups, mostly for education but also for other projects thought to advance reconciliation. One example was providing fishing boats to be used by both Christians and Muslims.¹⁸³ One Menko Kesra official explained the reason policy had shifted away from channelling aid through *bupati* as follows:

*“Initially, we distributed the aid directly to Poso district. However, Poso district officials used the aid to make new uniforms for civil servants and other routine activities. They did not know how to use the aid for rehabilitation and reconciliation.”*¹⁸⁴

Some aid was targeted at those directly involved in fighting. In 2005, Menko Kesra gave money to combatants on both sides in the hope that this would deter them from engaging in further conflict. The 2007 Menko Kesra budget took a different approach. The Provincial Police Office of Central Sulawesi worked through the foundation *Yayasan Bina Bangsa Mandiri* (YB2M) to develop training programmes for combatants so that they could find alternative livelihoods such as becoming mechanics and lake fish farmers. Such training sessions were useful but were not carried out as strategically as they could have been. For example, garages were set up for

mechanics but in areas that saw little traffic passing through.

Menko Kesra's spending was generally ad-hoc. Education was given particular focus as it was perceived to be “one of the important conflict prevention systems for the future in Poso.”¹⁸⁵ *Menko Kesra* built *Pesantren Ittihadul Ummah* at Tokorondo village for the Muslim community, an important and more moderate source of education than the Tana Runtuh which was believed to have produced and sheltered radical groups.¹⁸⁶ Menko Kesra also built the Tentena Christian University in Tentena for the Christian Community in 2007. *Menko Kesra* also built the Christian University of Tentena (*Universitas Kristen Tentena*) in Tentena for the Christian community. The opening of both schools was welcomed and many programmes on reconciliation and peace were held – although the results from such investments will take time to materialise. Such schemes might have prevented the violence in the first place, as one of the scholars at the University of Tadulako in Palu said: “*If the central government had undertaken conflict management initiatives earlier, the Poso conflict would not have spread to surrounding areas.*”¹⁸⁷

However, despite all the problems with Malino I, its implementation and the reconstruction funds that followed did mark a turning point in the conflict. Security forces began to enforce the law, arresting those carrying arms. It became easier to be pro-peace after Malino I and violence dropped significantly.

Law enforcement

There was strong demand for the law to be enforced even in early stages of the conflict. During the first meeting in Poso District with local leaders and religious leaders in December 1998, all participants agreed that both conflicting parties should be sanctioned if they attacked each other. Such sentiment was echoed in the *Rujuk Sintuwu Maroso* agreement made by *adat* leaders in August 2000.

However, the Government struggled to respond to such demands as they were inexperienced with the difficulties of law enforcement in a communal

¹⁸³ The most skilful fisher-folk were traditionally Muslims. Christians dominated some coastal areas but did not have such fishing skills. Providing boats was seen as one way to increase the interdependence between the two communities.

¹⁸⁴ Interview by Johari Efendi with an officer at Menko Kesra, Jakarta, 10 September 2009.

¹⁸⁵ Interview by Johari Efendi with an officer at Menko Kesra, Jakarta, 10 September 2009

¹⁸⁶ Karnavian, Tito (2008), pp.130-135.

¹⁸⁷ Interview by Johari Efendi & Akiko Horiba with a professor at University of Tadulako, Palu, 13 March 2010.

conflict where, by its very nature, many people were involved. As one academic put it: “*Most people in the conflict areas were actors in the conflict. If the law was enforced in conflict areas, the jail would be full everyone in the conflict area are involved directly or indirectly.*”¹⁸⁸

There was some action against the perpetrators of conflict in the early stages. This included the sentencing, in 1999, of Herman Parimo (a Christian leader accused of mobilising people from Tentena in the first phase of the conflict) to 15 years imprisonment. Agfar Patanga, the Muslim leader accused of provocation during the early stages of the conflict, also received six months imprisonment. Such trials provoked demonstrations from their respective supporters and still did not do enough to deter further conflict.

The inexperience of the police with law enforcement during a communal conflict complicated matters. The excessive use of force, mostly against Muslim groups who were perpetrating most of the violence during the second phase of the conflict, actually stimulated attacks against the Christian community.

During the third phase of the conflict, an agreement facilitated by the district government on 12 June 2000 requested people to hand in their weapons or they would be confiscated by the police. Police and security forces from Central Sulawesi carried out special operations *Operasi Sadar Maleo* (under the police) and *Operasi Cinta Damai* (under the military) with approximately 1300 personnel, which made it much more difficult for conflict actors to mobilise.¹⁸⁹

In May 2000, three Christian men, Fabianus Tibo, Domingus Dasilva, and Marinus Riwu were accused of perpetrating violence and brought to trial on 11 December 2000. In 2001 they were given the death sentence, and in September 2006 were executed. In the third phase of the conflict there were 90 individuals brought to the court and sentenced, mostly from the Christian community since at that point in the conflict they were carrying out most of the attacks.¹⁹⁰

The judiciary found it difficult to pass judgements in the midst of a conflict environment. Indeed, early in the conflict most of the accused were brought to court not in Poso district itself but tried in Palu. The police, judges and attorneys were sometimes not free to make decisions without being pressured.

Law enforcement was used much more extensively as a conflict management tool after Malino I had been signed. The agreement underlined the importance of “*efforts to enforce the law and support legal sanctions against lawbreakers*”. But the Government’s shift in approach was less to do with the specifics of the text and more about their growing confidence. Malino I was a declaration that the state was critical to the conflict’s resolution – and subsequently state authorities became emboldened to take action against conflict actors.

Indeed, as the process of Malino I was getting underway, there was a push for more vigorous action by the security forces. On 4 December 2001, President Megawati agreed to an integrated security operation in Poso which came to be called *Operasi Sintuwu Maroso*. It began on 7 December 2001 and ran for six months. The operation had four approaches: identify obstacles to the implementation of Malino I; raise public awareness about the need for law enforcement; preventive action to reduce the risk of violence between conflicting parties; and suppressive action and punishing those who commit criminal acts.¹⁹¹ At its peak the operation involved 4,162 security personnel.¹⁹² As well as more military and police being deployed to Poso after Malino I was agreed, higher ranked police officers were placed in Poso and a Brigadier-General put in charge instead of a Major-General, a clear sign of greater commitment to law enforcement.

In November 2005, a criminal investigation task force (*Satuan Tugas Bareskrim*, or *Satgas*) was sent to Poso in response to the beheading of three Christian high school students. This task force was supported by many elements in the police, including Indonesia’s counter-terrorism unit, Special Detachment 88 (*Detasemen Khusus 88*, or *DENSUS 88*). *Satgas* worked for a year and a half to identify networks of radical groups, eventually culminating on 11 and 22 January 2007 in police attacks on Tanah Runtuh where many such groups were based.¹⁹³

188 Interview by Johari Efendi & Akiko Horiba with a lecturer from the Christian University of Tentena who was a representative of the Christian community in the Malino talks, Poso, 12 March 2010.

189 Lasahido, Tahmidy (2003), p.55; Karnavian, Tito (2008), p.64; Saffri Dyah, Lidya Ariesusanty and Akmadi Abbas, *Dinamika Sosial dan Pembangunan di Kabupaten Poso*, (Subang: LIPI Press, 2006), pp.57-58.

190 Ecip, Sinansari (2002), p.68.

191 Ecip, Sinansari (2002), pp.166-167.

192 Rozi, Syafuan, Mashad, Dhururudin, et al (2005), p.53.

193 Karnavian, Tito (2008), vii, pp.126-206.



An Indonesian anti-terror squad member takes part in a raid on an Islamic militant stronghold Monday, Jan. 22, 2007 in Poso. The raid set off a three-hour gun battle which left nine suspected fighters and one officer dead, the local police chief said. © AP Photo

The police have been criticised by some for waiting so long to take such substantive action. This was partly motivated by a belief among the security forces that law enforcement must be ‘balanced’ and not disproportionately targeted at one community, even if it was carrying out more of the attacks. As one NGO worker explained, “*Everybody knew that there were radical groups in Tanah Runtu, but police did nothing and took action only after [Fabianus] Tibo was executed.*”¹⁹⁴ This reflects the approach in Ambon, where law enforcement only became effective after both Jafar Umar Talib and Alex Manuputi were arrested.

However, earlier in the conflict, Christians resented what they perceived to be a bias in the judicial system. Between 2001 and 2002, 24 Christians and nine Muslims were sent to jail. Part of the

reason for this is the different ways in which the communities mobilised – Christian leadership was clearer and better organised. Its hierarchy made those responsible for attacks easier to identify compared to the decentralised Muslim communities. Christians were also the main instigators of conflict at that point.

It is difficult to ascertain how successful law enforcement was in managing the conflict. The use of legal means in the aftermath of a communal conflict, where the causes are complex and perpetrators are many, is problematic. A verdict passed down may not be accepted by one community and is often perceived as biased. The death sentence passed down to Fabianus Tibo and two others, for example, was seen as biased by the Christian community. Legal action against Muslim groups prompted extremists to carry out several bombings in retaliation. The benefits of addressing impunity are large but must also be weighed up against the costs of legal action.

¹⁹⁴ Interview by Johari Efendi with NGO worker from Poso, 10 March 2010.

Non-governmental initiatives

There were no local or international NGOs in Poso before the conflict – most were based in Palu – but by 2003 the number had grown to 40.¹⁹⁵ It was only in 2001, after the Malino I peace declaration, that NGOs from Palu and international NGOs came and opened offices in Poso. Prior to that, the distribution of emergency aid was mainly conducted by the Ministry of Social Affairs (*Depsos*) or through religious institutions.

Across Indonesia, NGOs lacked experience in peacebuilding and conflict resolution. During most of the conflict, they focused on providing humanitarian assistance. As the people of Poso had little experience of working with NGOs it took some time for the NGOs to gain public co-operation and trust. Distributing emergency aid was seen as a means of gaining their trust before opening an office in Poso or moving towards reconciliation activities.¹⁹⁶

The focus on reconciliation began in 2001 when an informal group made up of NGOs from both sides of the religious divide, POKJA-RKP (the task force for Poso conflict reconciliation), was set up. It was based in Palu initially as it was deemed too difficult to discuss peace issues in Poso and many IDPs from Poso were based in Palu.¹⁹⁷ POKJA-RKP conducted several activities in Palu before Malino I including convening a neutral space for those from both sides of the conflict to talk to each other (sometimes for victims, at other times for combatants). This built greater awareness in Palu of the situation in Poso and increased the confidence of those involved in the conflict to talk about the issue. However, the initiative suffered as it was driven by those from Palu rather than Poso itself.

Eventually the task force became the Reconciliation Centre of Poso Conflict (*Pusat Rekonsiliasi Konflik Poso*, or PRKP) and shifted its base to Poso. NGOs began conducting training sessions and workshops on peacebuilding for youths, community leaders, religious leaders and combatants.¹⁹⁸

Some NGOs arranged exchange visits where Muslims were brought from Poso to Tentena and Christians from Tentena to Poso. Where possible, they helped facilitate the return of IDPs to their home villages.

NGOs in Palu advocated locally if they could but, if they felt it would jeopardise their safety or if it was to do with sensitive issues, NGOs in Jakarta would advocate on their behalf.

NGOs became increasingly engaged in advocating on peace issues. This reached its apex when a member of the Central Sulawesi Provincial Parliament called for a state of Civil Emergency (*Darurat Sipil*) for Poso. In response, in August 2001 several NGOs and members of the Indonesian Journalists' Alliance (AJI) in Palu met the Central Sulawesi Provincial Parliament (DPRD I SULTENG) to campaign against a call for state of civil emergency on Poso. The state of Civil Emergency was not imposed.¹⁹⁹ Several national NGOs campaigned for peace in Poso such as the Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI), the AJI, and the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (*Kontras*) – for the most part they worked closely with NGOs in Palu. NGOs in Palu advocated locally if they could but, if they felt it would jeopardise their safety or if it was to do with sensitive issues, NGOs in Jakarta would advocate on their behalf.

Part of this advocacy involved monitoring the Government's response to the conflict and critiquing it when it fell short. This oversight was especially necessary for the funding provided to the area after Malino I. From 2001 to 2005, Rp207 billion was given by the central government²⁰⁰; unsurprisingly, issues of corruption were raised by some NGOs. In April 2005, bombs exploded outside the offices of two of the NGOs that made such claims. Civil society also criticised the security operations carried out by the police and military, alleging that the military also had a business agenda in Poso.

However, NGOs themselves suffered because they were divided along religious lines, segregated geographically in the same way that the communities were, with those in Poso city mostly Muslim,

195 Interview by Johari Efendi & Akiko Horiba with a former vice Bupati of Poso, 10 March 2010.

196 Interview by Johari Efendi with Udin Ojobolo, Poso, 13 March 2010.

197 Lasahido, Tahmidy (2003), p.67; Interview by Johari Efendi with Daud Somba, an NGO worker in Poso and former member of POKJA-RKP, Poso, 12 December 2010.

198 Kantor Kementerian Koordinator Kesejahteraan Rakyat RI dengan P4K Universitas Tadulako, *Pengkajian Pelaksanaan Bantuan Pemulihan Kehidupan Masyarakat Pasca Konflik di Kabupaten Poso Sulawesi Tengah*, (Jakarta: Kantor Kementerian Koordinator Kesejahteraan Rakyat RI, 2009); See also Syafuan Rozi, Dhururudin Mashad, et. al. (2005), pp.68-69.

199 Lasahido, Tahmidy (2003), p.67.

200 Online news Rakyat Merdeka, *Aminuddin Tananan Kota*, 3 August (2006) www.rakyatmerdeka.co.id/nusantara/2006/08/03/1763/Aminuddin-Tananan-Kota, accessed on 27 December 2010.

and Christian NGOs in Tentena. Co-ordination between them was weak. Some international donors encouraged greater co-operation by making funding contingent upon collaboration with an NGO from the other side of the conflict. One result of this was the creation in 2005 of “Poso Center”, a collective office in Poso City for 32 NGOs from Jakarta, Palu and Poso.

Another weakness – and key lesson to learn – was the lack of real co-ordination between NGOs and local government. The Government’s focus was on *Pokja Malino*, a working group which consisted of local leaders and religious leaders. There was little consideration given to how the *Pokja Malino* and NGOs might work together on reconciliation activities. In 2005, the local government drew up a list of NGOs in Poso with the intention of offering them training, but this was never realised.

In terms of international NGOs, their role became more significant after the four Sulawesi Governors met on 28 July 2000 during which they resolved to seek assistance from international donors.²⁰¹ International NGOs (INGOs) such as World Vision Indonesia, Care International, Church World Services and Mercy Corps began operating in the area. In a similar way to local NGOs, the focus at first was on emergency aid and later shifted to peace-building, education, resettlement and livelihood issues after Malino I. Unsurprisingly, those NGOs with a Christian or Muslim background tended to focus more on servicing areas where those of the same religion were located.²⁰² There was some suspicion of INGOs, particularly among Muslim communities, because so few foreign staff registered themselves with the district government as they were required to do.²⁰³

Local community leaders

At the beginning of conflict, the role of community leaders in conflict management was significant. Within the framework of the MUSPIDA, district

government officials and security forces met and co-ordinated with community leaders to call for calm. In the first phase of conflict, 129 community and religious leaders agreed to work together to stop the violence. As community leaders were influential, their involvement was seen as important by the local government.

However, the capacity of the community leaders was increasingly questioned by the public when conflict continued into 2000. This was partly because of the emergence of a set of people who claimed to be community leaders but had in fact instigated and provoked conflict. It was also because of the inability or unwillingness of community leaders to control elements from outside Poso, such as Laskar Jihad, and Laskar Manguni²⁰⁴.

The success of early conflict management efforts depended on a strong working relationship between community leaders and local government. However as local government became increasingly distrusted, particularly by Christians, efforts by local government to facilitate community leaders from both communities were no longer as successful. The influence of the *adat* leaders had also diminished over time. The combination of increased immigration during the Soeharto era and Jakarta’s centralisation policy led to the decline of the role and influence of *adat* leaders and the rise in prominence of religious leaders. On 22 August 2000, the provincial government used *adat* leaders to try and find a solution in Poso. They presented the *Rujuk Sintuwu Maroso* agreement to the President based on Pamona ethnic traditions. However Poso’s ethnic diversity (the area has 13 different sub-ethnic groups, not all of which subscribe to Pamona traditions) undermined the agreement. Most of the *adat* leaders lacked influence compared to religious leaders. Muslims were especially sceptical of *adat* as they viewed the traditional Pamona dance (*derao*) as not fitting in with Islam.²⁰⁵

During the conflict, some village leaders played an important local role in conflict management. For example, in Male-Lage village, villagers worked together to protect the village from being attacked by others even though they were of differing religions and ethnicity. In Toyado village, there was an agreement between religious leaders not to create disturbances with other religious groups inside the village. In Tokorondo on the 25 May 2000, village

201 Ecip, Sinansari (2002), p.97

202 Forum Poso Bersatu website, *Kitorang So Bosan Le Hidup di Pengungsian*, September 27 (2008), Available at: http://posobersatu.multiply.com/journal/item/41/Laporan_Perjalanan_ke_Poso_2 accessed 15 September, 2010.

203 Kantor Kementerian Koordinator Kesejahteraan Rakyat RI dengan P4K Universitas Tadulako (2009), p.110; *Intelejen TNI selidiki keberadaan tentara asing di Poso*, 31 May 2002, available at: www.dephan.go.id/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=2574 accessed 15 September, 2010.

204 This is a Christian group that came from Manado, North Sulawesi.

205 Rozi, Syafuan, Mashad, Dhurorudin et al. (2005).

leaders from Tokorondo (predominantly Islamic) and Masani (predominantly Christian) made an agreement to work together if they were attacked from outside of their villages. In Tangkura village, villagers were attacked by others and people fled from the village but both Christians and Muslims helped each other to return to their village. While some of these efforts were effective, naturally their effects were limited to individual villages. Success was contingent upon strong, progressive local leadership and, in some cases, on the particular characteristics of the village. For example, part of the reason that Tangkura was a success story is that there was no dominant Central Sulawesi Christian Church in the area. Instead, a range of churches under different denominations were present – the lack of centralised control of one religious group limited the ability of its leaders to mobilise their constituents to commit violence.

There was greater scope for local leaders to play a more constructive role after Malino I since many were involved in the working groups disseminating the terms of the agreement to their communities (*Pokja Deklarasi Malino*, or *Pokja Deklama*). Approximately 235 community leaders were members of *Pokja Deklama* in 2002. These leaders worked well with security forces and district government. A good example of community involvement in the reconciliation process was *Muslims to Poso*, an initiative of several Muslim leaders in Poso city working together with the Central Sulawesi Christian Church in Tentena. They arranged for Muslims from Poso city to come to Tentena to visit IDPs from Poso as a means of building greater mutual understanding.²⁰⁶

Roles of women

There was minimal substantive involvement by women in the formal peace process. Only three women attended the Malino meeting, two from the Christian community and one from the Muslim community. The Christian representative was chosen through a meeting organized by the Christian community in Tentena, whereas the Muslim female representative was chosen because she was the head of the Muhamadiyah women's group. However, the presence of these women did not necessarily bring issues of concern to women to the table, as they had to submit to the broader agenda of their respec-

tive, male-dominated teams. Issues such as trauma healing and sexual violence were not discussed in negotiations. According to one academic:

*“Women, especially those who were pregnant, were the greatest victims of the conflict. At the same time, women were active in reconciliation at the grassroots level: Christian and Muslim women activists communicated with each other and we often held informal meetings for raising awareness. But though women's voices were very important for peace, we could not discuss our perspectives during the meeting in Malino. There were just three women and it was difficult to bring forward the typical problems that women face.”*²⁰⁷

To the extent that women were involved in peacemaking, it often depended on the position that women enjoyed in the social structure of their community. For example, Nelly Tan Alamako was a priestess in Sepe Village who took part in the Malino I process and lobbied against alleged abuse at a police security check point in her village in 2001.

During the conflict, women often played a “connecting” role, acting as links between otherwise segregated communities. This was particularly the case in areas where Muslims and Christians lived together such as Male Lage, Tangkura, Kilo 9 and Matakoto. They provided safe places for other families when villages came under attack. However, some women were directly involved in the conflict, either as combatants (for example, in Paulindai) or by providing indirect support such as food and shelter for combatants.²⁰⁸

Once Malino I was signed, women undertook a range of roles in promoting reconciliation and assisting the return of IDPs. In many cases women were the first to go back to their respective villages to evaluate the feasibility of returning more permanently. For example, in Tangkura both the Muslim and Christian communities in the village were displaced by the conflict and escaped to IDP resettlement camps. Following the Malino I declaration, women from both religious communities soon re-established communication in an effort to return to their villages. They organised inter-religious women-only meetings to discuss the possibility of

²⁰⁷ Interview by Johari Efendi with a lecturer at the Christian University of Tentena, Poso, 12 March 2010.

²⁰⁸ Ecip, Sinansari (2002), p.32.

²⁰⁶ Rozi, Syafuan, Mashad, Dhurorudin, et al. (2005), pp.66-68.

both communities returning to the village together. Existing inter-religious marriage facilitated the ability of some women to persuade men to return to their villages. One activist goes so far as to say that, “*Tangkura village returned to peace because of women’s initiatives.*”²⁰⁹

Women’s more proactive roles were also due, in part, to support from NGOs who hired many women as their programme staff and gave training sessions targeted at women on peacebuilding, reconciliation and income-generating opportunities.

Roles of the media

A local saying in Poso is that issues and rumours travel faster than motorcycles (*laju susuki lebih laju susupo*). As a result of the difficulties in accessing reliable information from the media in Poso, this had predictably negative consequences for the conflict.

There were no newspapers and magazines based in Poso during the conflict, although newspapers from Palu arrived in Poso by the late afternoon on the same day they were published. According to research from the Research Center for Peace and Conflict Management of the Tadulako University of University of Tadulako, such Palu-based newspapers tended to directly quote statements from one side without soliciting comment or checking facts with the other side, and this tended to trigger further conflict. Many people relied on radio for their information, which shared some problems with the newspapers in terms of repeating rumours.²¹⁰ A number of organisations attempted to address a lack of capacity amongst journalists, training them on peace journalism and standard journalistic practices.²¹¹

The media made more positive contributions later in promoting the campaign against the proposed imposition of the civil emergency status in Poso in 2001. Working together with NGOs in

Poso, the media covered news about NGOs meeting with the Provincial Local Parliament in Palu, which in turn generated support from NGOs at a national level. The images of the Malino I process were also powerful – the sight of Muslim and Christian leaders embracing each other was a clear sign to their respective communities that their elites had already agreed to stop violence.

After Malino I, the media gave some prominence to the reconciliation process, highlighting the activities of the *Pokja Deklama*. When bomb attacks occurred after Malino I, the media were more responsible, soliciting comments from the Government, security forces, NGOs and the *Pokja Deklama*. Their coverage encouraged security forces to take greater action in response to such attacks. NGOs enjoyed a close relationship with the media, which helped with their public advocacy campaigns on peace and reconciliation.

Conclusion

The fact that the conflict in Poso persisted for so long and was ultimately resolved largely relates to law enforcement. The police and government had little experience in the area of communal conflicts. The change in approach after Malino I contributed significantly to a reduction in violence – much more law enforcement should have been used early on. The Government’s lack of enthusiasm for enforcing the law early on meant that the public did not become accustomed to seeing participation in the conflict as criminal acts that should and would be punished.

The fact that an intervention from central government was needed to help resolve the conflict is indicative of the failure of local government leaders. Different levels of government had comparative advantages that could be used in a strategic way but the relationships within government – particularly between the provincial and district levels – were more often competitive than co-operative. The gradual shift from local government that had a religiously-balanced composition to one dominated by Muslims in most areas created resentment in the lead-up to the conflict; and when conflict did break out, they lacked the credibility to effectively coordinate peace initiatives. Indeed, local government was complicit in some cases – such as in the third phase of conflict, when the Tentena sub-district government failed to warn Poso district about an

209 Interview Johari Efendi & Akiko Horiba with a Christian woman activist and researcher of the Tangkura case, Poso, 12 March 2010.

210 Institute Studi Arus Informasi (ISAI) and International Media Support (IMS), *Peran Media dalam Pembangunan Perdamaian dan Rekonsiliasi Sulawesi Tengah, Maluku dan Maluku Utara*, (Jakarta: UNDP dan BAPPENAS, 2004).

211 Capacity-building for journalists was carried out by several NGOs such as LSPP (Lembaga Studi Pers dan Pembangunan), The British Council, LP3ES (Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial) and PWI (Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia). Capacity-building for media institutions was conducted by Internews Indonesia, KBR-68H (Kantor Berita Radio 68H) and Common Ground Indonesia.

impending attack by Christian groups. In other cases, local government efforts, rather than the product of ill will, were well intentioned but mis-directed; for example, the decision by the four Governors of Sulawesi to use 13 *adat* leaders for a *Rujuk Sintuwu Maroso* ceremony to aid reconciliation. The ceremony did not have the buy-in of many groups involved in the conflict, particularly from the Muslim community, and the initiative suffered because it did not involve district leaders. The working group set up after the ceremony, the *Pokja Rujuk Sintuwu*, was resented by district governments.

Malino I did mark a turning point in the conflict. The three choices presented by Jusuf Kalla to the conflict parties showed that the Government had the power to help resolve the conflict and the political will to exercise it. In the latter phases of the conflicts, Muslim groups were launching the majority of attacks and, because they were ascendant, they were not inclined to make peace (just as Christians were during the third phase of the conflict when they were dominant). However, Jusuf

Kalla's implicit threat that prolonging the conflict would make them a target of the central government was taken seriously and had a strong deterrent effect. As Malino I was the first time that the central government was involved in facilitating the resolution of communal conflict, there were certainly weaknesses with the process, not least how quickly the "agreement" was reached. Lessons from the process in Poso were learnt and applied more successfully in Ambon later.

When Malino I was signed, it did not have full public support, despite growing fatigue with the conflict. To gain this, the Government used the media fully to push its message of reconciliation and combined this effectively with the *Pokja Deklama* to disseminate the terms of the agreement at a community level. While trust in the *Pokja Deklama* was lacking, as people perceived it to be linked to corrupt use of funds, perhaps its single greatest achievement was that local leaders who had tacitly or actively supported the conflict became agents of peace.

Annexes

Annex 1: Research methodology

The Indonesia report is part of three country studies generated as part of the project, 'Comparative Perspectives on Peacemaking in Asia'. Other foci include India and the Philippines. Additional support from the International Development Research Centre enabled the researchers from across these nations to come together in Singapore in May 2009 to build contacts and links in the early days of the project.

Three trips to Ambon and three to Poso were undertaken between July 2009 and March 2010, to hold a series of focus group discussions and individual interviews with local government officials, community and religious leaders, and members of civil society including women's rights advocates. The research was undertaken to gather first-hand information from the local community and significant actors on their perspectives of conflict management. It also helped to identify lessons learned.

Two further workshops informed the process. These were organised in the third quarter of 2009: in Ambon on 14 October and in Poso on 8 December. They were part of a series of three workshops funded by the Canadian Embassy in Jakarta as part of the HD Centre project Women at the Peace Table Indonesia, supplementing resources from the MacArthur Foundation for gauging views and input.

The final workshop was held in Pontianak, West Kalimantan, on 2 February 2010, to share and exchange lessons learnt from the Maluku and Poso experience (although a case study on the conflict in West Kalimantan is not incorporated in this report). They brought together representatives from local government agencies, NGOs, academics, as well as religious and traditional leaders to discuss conflict management strategies in the three regions and the progress towards reconciliation and reconstruction which has been achieved to date. Participants were encouraged to put forward recommendations that could improve the conflict management approach undertaken by both governmental and non-governmental actors.

The research process in Papua included a wide range of interviews in the province as well as interviews and seminars in Jakarta with representatives from civil society, religious groups and the Government. In total almost 100 interviews were undertaken, mostly in Papua and seven workshops were held, including five in Jakarta. The workshops focused on a variety of issues related to conflict resolution options.

An annotated literature review was developed between August and October 2009. It includes studies, papers and articles on the Indonesian case studies – Papua, Maluku, and Poso in Central Sulawesi – and overall conflict management in Indonesia.²¹²

212 It is available at: www.hdcentre.org/projects/peacemaking-research

Annex 2: Overview of key meetings of the WPNCL

1. Think-Tank Papuan Leaders' Meeting in Nieuwegein, Holland in mid-2003²¹³

This meeting emphasized the need for national unity and reconciliation among all Papuan political and social groups. Primary objectives were to discuss national unity, reconciliation and consolidation within the wider Papuan community, and resistant movements in particular, and also to find appropriate strategies to achieve those goals by dividing tasks among the main political, military and social groups.

2. Papuan Leaders Consultation Workshop in Abepura, West Papua in late 2004

During this workshop, the leaders discussed reconciliation and consolidation efforts within the movement, they agreed to organize a Papuan leaders summit, and discussed the way forward.

3. Papuan Leaders Consultation meeting in Sydney 2004

The meeting was about the revitalization of the Task Force for Reconciliation²¹⁴, and the roles and responsibilities of the Coalition's members inside and outside West Papua.

4. Papuan Leaders' consultation in Port Vila in late 2004²¹⁵

The meeting discussed reconciliation and consolidation with the OPM as a priority and stated the need to: "unify different perceptions and then form

213 Ondawame, Otto, *Let's Work Together to End the Suffering of Our People*, Briefing Paper, (Port Vila: WPNCL, 2008), p.3.

214 The Task Force for Reconciliation is today called the Working Group for the Coalition. The main tasks of the Task Force for Reconciliation were to consult with different factions within the OPM/TPN, and also with different resistant movements, in order to move towards internal reconciliation. These tasks are continued by the Working Group for the Coalition but focusing on peaceful dialogue as the main objective.

215 Ondawame, Otto (2008), p.5.

a united front that will represent the aspirations of the people of West Papua²¹⁶.

5. A meeting in Yambi, Papua New Guinea in late 2005²¹⁷

This resulted in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for better working relationships between the various elements of the resistance, and the establishment of the West Papuan National Coalition for Liberation as the main umbrella organization in the liberation struggle.

6. A meeting in Madang, Indonesia in mid-2006²¹⁸

This was between several commanders and representatives of the TPN who declared their support for unity as well as peaceful dialogue.

7. A military leaders meeting at the beginning of 2007²¹⁹

The military leaders held a meeting in Papua and decided to reorganize the existing military structure, and they emphasized the urgent need for reconciliation and consolidation.²²⁰ Further they recommended political leaders to organize a Papuan Leaders Summit.

8. A meeting in Ipoh, Malaysia in late 2007²²¹

The meeting discussed the broad terms of reference for possible peace talks, reinforced the Coalition structure and concluded with a decision to organize a high level meeting of Papuan Leaders in Port Vila to continue discussions.

216 Ondawame, Otto (2008), p.5.

217 Task Force for Reconciliation, *Briefing Paper*, (Port Vila: Secretariat of the WPNCL, 2006), p.6. See also Ondawame, Otto (2008), p.5.

218 Task Force for Reconciliation, *Memorandum of Understanding*, (Madang, 2008). See also: Ondawame, Otto (2008), pp.6-7.

219 Task Force for Reconciliation, TPN leaders meeting in the Headquarters of the OPM in the jungle to discuss their position on the reconciliation process, 7 April 2007.

220 The military reconstruction involved the abolishment of Commando Units within the PN (PEMKA Unit, Victory Unit and Arfak 1965 Unit). All units were merged into one National Liberation Army.

221 Ondawame, Otto (2008), p.7.

9. The High Level Papuan Leaders Summit in Port Vila, Vanuatu in mid-2008²²²

More than 50 delegates and observers representing 13 various resistance movements participated in the summit and signed a new MoU to work together towards peaceful dialogue. However, a few key actors could not or did not attend the summit for various reasons. Nevertheless, the new leadership has committed to bring them into the national body in the near future.

²²² Ondawame, Otto (2008), pp.8-18.